Online Appendix

Cutting in Line: How Powerful Organized Interests Hasten & Delay Executive Branch Nominations

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1 The Confirmation Process

The Senate approval process of presidential nominations to federal and civil service positions in the executive and judicial branches is a crucial form of executive oversight. The Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution states that the president "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for" (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2). For a complete list of presidential appointments, see the United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions publication, more commonly known as the Plum Book. The Plum Book contains information on over 7,000 Federal and civil service and leadership non-competitive appointments to the executive and legislative branch. Over 1,200 presidential appointments require Senate approval. Not all of those positions are full-time however (Carey and Palmer, 2011).

After research and review of potential nominees, the president sends formal nominations to the Senate where the nomination is immediately referred to the germane committee. Nominations can also be vetted through multiple Senate committees, either jointly or sequentially, depending on the jurisdiction of the committee. Committees act as information gatherers on nominees to executive branch positions and are responsible for fully vetting a nominee before it reaches the Senate floor. The committee of jurisdiction may hold a hearing on a nomination, although this is not a requirement. A nominee must receive approval from the majority of Senators on the committee before being considered on the Senate floor. "To be considered on the Senate floor, the nomination must have been reported from the committee of jurisdiction or all Senators must agree to its consideration" (Carey and Palmer, 2011, p. 4). Thus, Senate committees also serve a gate-keeping function. Once on the floor, final approval is customarily given by unanimous consent agreements (UCAs) or a voice vote (requiring a simple majority) during an executive session of the Senate. Roll call votes, which also require a simple majority, are also taken on the floor.

Besides confirmation or the failure to be confirmed (which we call rejection), nominations can returned to or withdrawn by the president at any time of the process. Return indicates that the nominee never received a vote before a recess or before the end of the congressional session. Specifically, the Congressional Research Service defines returns as "Nominations that are not confirmed or rejected are returned to the President at the end of a session or when the Senate adjourns or recesses for more than 30 days (Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6). If the President still wants a nominee considered, he must submit a new nomination to the Senate." (Rybicki, 2023, pg. 13). A lesser number of nominations are withdrawn by the president. In this process, the president removes the nominee from consideration and has to restart the nomination process for that position. Our analyses explicitly take these different outcomes into account.

2 Tier Appointments & Agency Characteristics

Following McCarty and Razaghian (1999), we classified appointments to the executive branch in tiers:

- 1. **Tier-1 Appointments:** Secretaries, Attorneys-General, and the Administrator of the EPA.
- Tier-2 Appointments: Under secretaries, deputy secretaries, assistant secretary, under attorneys-general, deputy attorneys-general, and assistant attorneys-general. We have also included assistant administrators of the EPA, which is different from McCarty & Razaghian (1999).
- 3. **Tier-3 Appointments:** The remaining tier serves as a base category and includes a hodgepodge of job titles, all of which are much more directly connected with specific agencies within the departments. The job titles include deputy assistant secretary, director, administrator, chief, and commissioner. The residual category also contains a few job titles that concern department-wide responsibilities but are not of the rank of assistant secretary, such as general counsel and inspector general.

Further clarification on Executive Branch Appointments:¹

- **Cabinet:** The secretaries or other leaders of these agencies are in Tier-1. The Cabinet is made up of senior appointed officials, usually heads of executive departments.
- Executive (not Cabinet): There are several agencies in the executive branch that are not Cabinet-level. These include regulatory agencies, government corporations, commissions, and independent agencies that otherwise do not report directly to the President. Heads of executive agencies can be classified as Tier-1 or Tier-2.
- Legislative: There are a few agencies that exist within the legislative branch that serve Congress and legislators (ex: Government Printing Office). These are classified as Tier-2.
- Judicial: Tax courts are the main appointments in the judicial branch; they are not included in our study, which focuses on appointments to the executive branch.
- Quasi-Official: This variable isn't included in our final models. Quasi-official agencies are not officially executive agencies but are required by statute to publish certain information on their programs and activities in the Federal Register. These are classified as Tier-2.
- Independent: This variable roughly notes the level of control the President has over the agency. For example, heads of independent agencies usually cannot be removed without cause. Independent agencies are created by Congress to address concerns that go beyond the scope of typical legislation; they are responsible for ensuring the government and economy

¹Source: http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/Federal/Executive.shtml

runs efficiently. Most of these appointments are classified as Tier-2, but some may be Tier-1. This variable is not included in final models.

- **Board/Commission/Council:** This variable indicates organizations that make decisions through commission or committee-style. Individual presidential appointees therefore have less influence (by vote) over the agency's operation because decisions are made by a group of people. These groups usually issue rules and are established by Presidential or congressional action. They are classified as Tier-2.
- Government Corporation: Government corporations are generally set up to implement a market-based program, such as subsidy programs. They blur the line between public-private, and their heads enjoy different degrees of independence from the President and Congress. They are classified as Tier-2.
- International Organization: This includes groups such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and others to which the President nominates a representative(s) of the United States. Due to the domestic focus of this paper, appointments to international organizations are not included in our dataset.

3 Measuring the Power of Organized Interests

As we describe in the paper, we aim to test a theory of interest group involvement in executive branch nominations that incorporates their social or coalitional power, corresponding to *H2*. To this end, we calculated a measure of interest group power based on the centrality of a group within its political network. That is, we expect that interest groups with larger network centrality scores which are based on their relative position of influence in the network—are more effective in their opposition to and support of executive branch nominations than interest groups with relatively less of this power. To do so we rely on large-scale data of coordinated and purposive coalitional interest group activity, the Supreme Court amicus curiae network (Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson, 2014).

We expect that the general coalitional behavior of organized interests centers more on shared issue concern than the branch of the government that they are interacting with, and therefore use a centrality measure from this judicial network to test whether there is an impact of coalitional power on executive branch nominations. While this network measure is derived from judicial branch interactions, scholars have found it to be an appropriate measure of interest group connectivity across the branches of government based on qualitative evidence from interviews that support the idea that interest group coalitions arise naturally in the pursuit of shared political interests and persist across policy entry points, such as the courts, legislatures, and bureaucracies(Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Hitt, 2013; Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson, 2014). If we error in using this measure we have made it more likely to commit a type II error. Should the coalitions found before the Court not translate to other branches we would be less likely to reject the null hypothesis for H2.

A number of measures of network centrality exist. We rely on eigenvector centrality because it is frequently used as a proxy for power in a network (Bonacich, 1972, 2007). It is particularly useful since it delineates global power in the network from more local power structures. That is, it weights relationships between nodes according to their centralities, not just the number of connections, which means that both direct and indirect relationships are accounted for. Thus, eigenvector centrality gives us a good idea of social power (not just popularity or frequency) since it tells us who is connected to the best connected in the network.

We match the eigenvector centrality scores from the network data with the corresponding group in the nomination data—i.e., the Senate Committee Hearing testimony or in the LexisNexis search. Approximately 27% of organized interests before the Court are also active in the nominations data in this period. We create dummy variables indicating the presence of one or more powerful interest groups in support of and opposition to each nominee by considering an interest group powerful if it has an eigenvector centrality score in the top two quartiles of the distribution. All interest groups that lobbied for the nominee but had no coalition activity according to the network information remain in the data, but are considered to be of low power and placed into the zero categories of the power dummies.

Eigenvector centrality refers to the value of the first eigenvector of the network with respect to

the sum of the groups to which it is connected. The eigenvector centrality of a group is:

$$\lambda x_i = \sum_{j=1}^n a_{ij} x_j,$$

where $a_{ij} = 1$ if the groups have a connection, 0 otherwise, λ is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, and x is the group's centrality.

Consider the hypothetical network in Figure 1. Here the nodes are sized according to their eigenvector centralities, the scores of which are listed above the nodes. We can see that the score for a node is proportional to the sum of the scores for all nodes it is directly connected to. Nodes with high scores are connected to other nodes with high scores. Eigenvector centrality then gives us a good idea of who is connected to the best connected in the network.

Figure 1: Calculating Eigenvector Centrality Scores



The need to summarize the power of potentially several interest groups for each nominee further motivates the use of dummy variables to indicate the presence and direction of a powerful group. We use dummies instead of additive indices or central tendencies, because our hypotheses are concerned with 'who lobbies' and not merely 'how many lobby.' To be sure, the number of supporters or opponents may be important, and therefore we also test this hypothesis with the two aforementioned variables that count the number of supporters and opponents for each nominee (H1). However, we have reason to believe that legislators pay special attention to particular groups, the most powerful ones, even when large numbers of groups lobby in the other direction. Summing the scores obscures the ability to trace the presence of a single powerful group when many groups lobby the nominee. Similarly, central tendencies could dilute the impact that a single well connected group might have by reducing the value of the power score in the presence of other groups. Thus, we rely on dichotomous indicators of powerful groups in support and opposition.

In addition, as a robustness check, we lower the threshold level for a group to be considered powerful in the Appendix section below. Specifically, we check to see if the results are consistent across for any non-zero eigenvector centrality score. The lower threshold results are substantively similar to the higher one in the manuscript.

4 Summary Statistics & Sample Details

Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the key variables in the models. We include here all variables beginning with the independent variables (including those considered only in the robustness tests in the Appendix section below), committee and session dummies, and then the dependent variables.

	mean	sd	min	max	count
Number Groups in Support	0.731	5.417	0.000	161.000	3845
Number Groups in Opposition	0.240	3.641	0.000	130.000	3845
Powerful Group in Support	0.042	0.202	0.000	1.000	3845
Powerful Group in Opposition	0.014	0.117	0.000	1.000	3845
Third Tier	0.758	0.428	0.000	1.000	3845
Reappointment	0.125	0.331	0.000	1.000	3845
Recess Appointment	0.048	0.213	0.000	1.000	3845
Divided Government	0.375	0.484	0.000	1.000	3845
Median Member Ideology	0.000	1.000	-1.505	1.877	3845
Chair Ideology	0.000	1.000	-1.337	1.758	3845
Presidential Support	-0.000	1.000	-2.555	1.097	3168
Presidential Approval	-0.000	1.000	-2.314	3.273	3845
Ag, Nutrition, Forestry	0.046	0.210	0.000	1.000	3845
Bank, Housing, Urban Affairs	0.105	0.307	0.000	1.000	3845
Commerce	0.143	0.350	0.000	1.000	3845
Energy, Natural Resources	0.057	0.232	0.000	1.000	3845
Environment, Public Works	0.076	0.266	0.000	1.000	3845
Finance	0.094	0.292	0.000	1.000	3845
Home Security, Gov Affairs	0.087	0.281	0.000	1.000	3845
Indian Affairs	0.011	0.106	0.000	1.000	3845
Rules, Administration	0.017	0.128	0.000	1.000	3845
Small Business	0.006	0.075	0.000	1.000	3845
Veteran Affairs	0.022	0.147	0.000	1.000	3845
Two Committees	0.037	0.189	0.000	1.000	3845
106	0.087	0.282	0.000	1.000	3845
107	0.149	0.356	0.000	1.000	3845
108	0.118	0.323	0.000	1.000	3845
109	0.126	0.332	0.000	1.000	3845
110	0.099	0.299	0.000	1.000	3845
111	0.127	0.334	0.000	1.000	3845
112	0.066	0.249	0.000	1.000	3845
113	0.083	0.275	0.000	1.000	3845
114	0.040	0.196	0.000	1.000	3845
115	0.104	0.306	0.000	1.000	3845
Returned	0.257	0.437	0.000	1.000	3845
Withdrawn	0.064	0.245	0.000	1.000	3845
Confirmed	0.678	0.467	0.000	1.000	3845

Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables table

We collected the data on nominees and the nomination process from the database on Presidential Nominations at the Library of Congress. The data begins with the 106^{th} Congress, which started on January 3, 1999, and ends with the 115^{th} , which concluded on January 3, 2019. This timeframe gives us two decades of nominations data, across four presidents. In addition, it provides consistent committee titles and jurisdiction, since the current committee structure was established in the 106^{th} . For example, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor was changed to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions. By relying on data collected over several sessions we are able to make more generalizable conclusions about the nature of interest group involvement in executive nominations. The longitudinal data also affords us partian and cyclical balance since it

includes nominations from both Democratic and Republican presidents at the beginning, middle, and end of their terms as well as in periods of divided and unified government. Note that if a nominee is reappointed, then they are included again as a new observation with all data, including the interest group variables, matching the parameters of their new nomination. In total, this analysis looks at 3,845 unique executive branch nominations.

We focus on appointments subject to Presidential Appointment with Senate Confirmation (PAS). PAS appointments include Cabinet, deputy secretaries, under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and general councils, among other appointments. Appointments include nominations to federal agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration, to independent federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, and appointments to independent regulatory commissions. Specifically, this analysis contains all executive branch nominations that are vetted through the following Senate Committees: Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; Budget; Commerce, Science and Transportation; Energy and Natural Resources; Environment and Public Works; Health, Education, Labor and Pensions; Finance; Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; Rules and Administration; Small Business and Entrepreneurship; Veteran's Affairs; Indian Affairs.

Of the nominations, 1,146 (almost one third of all nominations in our database) went through the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee; 549 went through through Commerce, Science, and Transportation; 405 through Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; 363 through Finance; 333 through Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; 294 through Environment and Public Works; 220 through Energy and Natural Resources; and less than 200 through Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Budget, Indian Affairs, Rules and Administration, Small Business and Entrepreneurship, and Veterans' Affairs.

There are 29 nominations that both went through committees outside of this list (e.g., the Senate Committee on Armed Services or Foreign Relations) as well as a committee on our list. For example, the nominee for the Assistant Secretary of Energy in the 106th Congressional Session went through both the Energy and Natural Resources and the Armed Services committees. Thus, we address all the presidential nominations to the executive branch, apart from judicial, Department of State and Department of Defense appointments. We do not address judicial nominations—neither nominations to the Supreme Court nor to the lower-courts—since appointments of judges are fundamentally different than appointments to the executive branch. For example, federal judges serve lifetime terms, whereas appointments to the executive branch typically coincide with the presidential term. Many studies have addressed judicial nominations (e.g., Caldeira and Wright, 1998; Cameron, Cover and Segal, 1990; Bell, 2002; Binder and Maltzman, 2002; Scherer, 2005; Scherer, Bartels and Steigerwalt, 2008). Additionally, presidential appointments to the Departments of State and Defense are unusual in so far as they have a non-domestic nature, and are therefore similarly excluded. Thus, nominations to the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence committees are excluded, as are those to the Judiciary Committee.

As we noted in the manuscript, nominations can also be vetted through multiple Senate com-

mittees, either jointly or sequentially, depending on the jurisdiction of the committee. Joint or sequential referrals are typically made by unanimous consent (Rybicki, 2019). In our data, which occurs across the $106^{th} - 115^{th}$ congressional sessions, 3.7% of nominations were referred to two Senate committees, or 142 out of 3,845 total nominations. For the 142 nominees referred to two committees, we entered them once in our data with the committee information of the last committee they went through. Results are not sensitive to the committee chosen for these observations.

Once on the floor, final approval is customarily given by unanimous consent agreements (UCAs) or a voice vote (requiring a simple majority) during an executive session of the Senate. Roll call votes, which also require a simple majority, are also taken on the floor. In our data, only 179 nominations were approved through a roll call vote, or 4.7% of the 3,845 nominations in our dataset and 6.8% of the 2,608 nominees who were confirmed. The Senate approves a majority of presidential appointments, and the vast majority of executive appointments are routine (Bell, 2002; Krutz, Fleisher and Bond, 1998). In our data, 67.8% of nominees, or 2,608 of 3,845, were confirmed.

In terms of the interest groups data, as we state in the manuscript, we collected it from testimony from Senate committee hearings. Letters of support or opposition, which are included in the supplementary materials of the Senate Committee Hearing Testimony—also available in the Library of Congress' database of Presidential Nominations—were read and the group name and their position on a nominee were recorded. This does not include the witnesses that are formally called to testify, which in nomination hearings are most often the nominees themselves. We note that in the 111^{th} Congress the Senate Committee Hearing testimony was not available for all nominations that were vetted by the Environment and Public Works Committee. Furthermore, although committee hearing testimony from the Senate Commerce Committee is available, interest groups did not (and, perhaps, could not) submit letters indicating their support or opposition to nominees.

We also collected all news and op-ed articles indicating organized interest support or opposition of a presidential nominee. A broad search was conducted through LexisNexis using the name of a nominee along with applicable keywords, e.g., "nomination," "support," and "opposition" (Scherer, Bartels and Steigerwalt, 2008). Hearing Testimony and news articles were coded by both undergraduate and graduate student coders. A supervisor regularly performed checks of each spreadsheet for inter-coder reliability and accuracy.

5 Fully Specified Models & Robustness Tests

We include the fully specified models from the manuscript graphs here in the Appendix. We also present a series of robustness tests. All of the models are presented in terms of the hazard and subhazard ratios. The hazard and subhazard ratios are simply the exponentiated coefficient from the competing risk models. That is, the exponentiated coefficients are the ratio of the hazards for a one-unit change in the relevant covariate holding all else constant. Thus, if the ratio is greater than one, there is an increase in the (sub)hazard or risk due to a one-unit increase in the covariate. Ratios less than one signal a decrease in the (sub)hazard or an increase in the chance of survival. In our models of executive nominees, a ratio greater than one indicates that an increase in the covariate leads to a quicker appointment decision, be that confirmation, withdraw, return or passage out of committee. A ratio of less than one means that an increase in the covariate leads to a postponement of the decision.

The tables in the manuscript are all competing risks duration models. That is, we use a survival model that takes into account the fact that nominations are ultimately at risk of more than one event. Since the probability of a nominee being confirmed will depend upon the decision rate due to confirmation, but also the decision rate due to other causes—specifically, withdrawals and returns—we use a competing risks regression model based on the subhazard function of the event of primary interest (Fine and Gray, 1999; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). The approach also allows us to make novel analyses on the rate of withdrawl and return, which has historically received relatively little empirical scrutiny.

5.1 Manuscript Models

In the body of the manuscript we present figures for the coefficients of several key variables from each model, as well as the more readily interpretable subhazard ratios for the two sets of interest group variables corresponding to H1 and H2. We include the fully specified models here in terms of the subhazard ratios. As noted above and in the manuscript, these are all competing risks duration models. Our first sets of figures on the entire duration of the appointment process is drawn from Table 2. Our second set of tests on the committee stage alone are from Table 3.

Table 2: Duration	of Executive l	Nominations				
	(1) (2) (3)					
	Confirmed	Withdrawn	Returned			
	b/se	b/se	b/se			
Number Cround in Support	1.002	0.002	0.087			
Number Groups in Support	(0.004)	(0.992)	0.967			
Number Cround in Oppedition	(0.004)	(0.025)	(0.021)			
Number Groups in Opposition	(0.002)	(0.975)	(0.985)			
Dowonful Crown in Support	(0.002)	(0.035)	(0.009)			
Fowering Group in Support	(0.146)	(0.254)	(0.180)			
Powerful Crown in Opposition	(0.140) 0 546**	(0.234) 1 217	0.109)			
Fowering Group in Opposition	(0.125)	(0.820)	(0, 400)			
Thind Tion	(0.125) 0.776***	(0.829)	(0.490)			
1 mild 1 lei	(0.040)	(0.217)	(0.008)			
Deepersintment	(0.040)	(0.217)	(0.098)			
псарроппшен	(0.057)	(0.183)	(0.105)			
Bocoss Appointment	(0.001) 0.149***	6 036***	0.100)			
necess Appointment	(0.024)	(1 109)	2.101 (0.304)			
Divided Covernment	(0.024) 0.757***	(1.10 <i>4)</i> 2 042***	(0.304) 1 989***			
Divided Government	(0.035)	(0.272)	(0.086)			
Modion Mombon Ideology	0.005***	(0.272)	(0.000)			
Median Member Ideology	(0.903)	(0.072)	(0.040)			
Descidential Approximatel	(0.020)	(0.073)	(0.040)			
Presidential Approval	(0.020)	(0.045)	$(0.005^{-1.1})$			
A m Nutwition Forester	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.027)			
Ag, Nutrition, Forestry	(0.126)	(0.980)	(0.121)			
Dark Hansing Habon Affains	(0.130)	(0.402)	(0.126)			
Bank, Housing, Urban Anairs	1.183°	1.929^{++}	$(0.00)^{++}$			
Commence	(0.000)	(0.400)	(0.064)			
Commerce	(0.070)	(0.276)	(0.000)			
En anna Nataral Daaraa	(0.079)	(0.270)	(0.080)			
Energy, Natural Resources	1.140	1.431	(0.199)			
Environment Dublic Works	(0.106)	(0.474)	(0.128)			
Environment, Public works	(0.970)	(0, 400)	(0.124)			
P	(0.062)	(0.409)	(0.124)			
Finance	(0.000)	1.(38)	1.005			
Hanna Gammitan Cham Affaire	(0.000)	(0.391)	(0.118)			
Home Security, Gov Anairs	(0.872)	1.4(0)	1.081			
Indian Affaina	(0.069)	(0.353)	(0.120)			
Indian Analis	(0.175)	(0.007)	(0.705)			
Deles Administration	(0.175)	(0.907)	(0.251)			
Rules, Administration	(0.157)	1.401	1.249			
Coursell Descriptions	(0.157)	(0.624)	(0.243)			
Small Business	0.808	1.(85	1.12(
Votonon Affaina	(0.223)	(1.296)	(0.435)			
veteran Anairs	1.419°	2.141	(0.125)			
Two Committees	(0.208)	(0.964)	(0.133)			
1 wo Committees	1.192	1.555	(0.100)			
	(0.118)	(0.571)	(0.102)			
Ν	3845.000	3845.000	3845.000			
aic	40198.569	3960.191	15909.968			
bic	40336.169	4097.791	16047.568			

Table 3: Duration of Executive Nominations in Committee				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Passed	Withdrawn	Returned	
	b/se	b/se	b/se	
		-/		
Number Groups in Support	1.003	0.995	0.775^{*}	
	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.090)	
Number Groups in Opposition	1.012^{***}	0.982	0.976	
	(0.003)	(0.034)	(0.016)	
Powerful Group in Support	1.627^{***}	0.131	1.325	
	(0.152)	(0.146)	(0.423)	
Powerful Group in Opposition	0.772	1.661	2.136^{*}	
	(0.153)	(1.012)	(0.638)	
Third Tier	0.721***	1.289	1.344**	
	(0.034)	(0.238)	(0.146)	
Reappointment	0.914	0.962	1.103	
	(0.054)	(0.205)	(0.119)	
Recess Appointment	0 161***	7 905***	2 999***	
recess ripponition.	(0.024)	(1.265)	(0.358)	
Divided Government	0.676***	2 382***	1 508***	
Divided Government	(0.070)	(0.345)	(0.120)	
Modian Mombor Idealary	0.020)	1.025	1 195**	
Median Member Ideology	(0.981)	1.020	(0.047)	
Describeration American I	(0.019)	(0.080)	(0.045)	
Presidential Approval	1.18(****	(0.794^{-11})	0.934	
	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.032)	
Ag, Nutrition, Forestry	1.278**	1.099	0.532**	
	(0.116)	(0.453)	(0.126)	
Bank, Housing, Urban Affairs	1.309^{***}	2.015^{**}	0.538^{***}	
	(0.091)	(0.497)	(0.084)	
Commerce	1.445^{***}	1.320	0.551^{***}	
	(0.089)	(0.299)	(0.074)	
Energy, Natural Resources	1.746^{***}	0.986	0.457^{***}	
	(0.157)	(0.408)	(0.106)	
Environment, Public Works	1.086	1.685	0.832	
	(0.087)	(0.449)	(0.126)	
Finance	0.842^{*}	1.972**	0.977	
	(0.062)	(0.446)	(0.127)	
Home Security, Gov Affairs	0.922	1.517	0.920	
	(0.067)	(0.381)	(0.125)	
Indian Affairs	1.066	2.189	0.675	
	(0.176)	(0.976)	(0.272)	
Bules. Administration	0.878	0.267	1.427	
reality, realitistication	(0.159)	(0.276)	(0.287)	
Small Business	0.083	9 196	1 077	
Small Dubilicop	(0.205)	(1 520)	(0.488)	
Votoron Affairs	1 272*	2 150	0.400/	
veterall Allalis	(0.100)	2.100 (1.055)	(0.149)	
True Committees	(0.190)	(1.000)	(0.142)	
1 wo Committees	$1.2(2^{})$	0.800	$0.250^{}$	
	(0.108)	(0.419)	(0.091)	
Ν	3845.000	3845.000	3845.000	
11	-22208.201	-1682.811	-5649.128	
aic	44460.403	3409.621	11342.255	
bic	44598 002	3547 221	11479 855	
510	10000.002	3011.221	1110.000	

Table 2. D sf E-ЪT ns in C

5.2 Lower Threshold for Power Models

In the manuscript we have chosen to test the impact of interest group power on executive nominations by creating two dummy variables denoting the presence of one or more powerful interest groups in support of and opposition to each nominee. If one or more powerful interest groups supported the nominee then the power support dummy is coded one, zero otherwise. Likewise, if one or more powerful interest groups opposed the nominee then the power opposition dummy is coded one, zero otherwise. In the manuscript, we consider an interest group powerful if it has an eigenvector centrality score in the top two quartiles of the distribution. All interest groups that lobbied for the nominee but had no coalition activity according to the network information are considered to be of low power and placed into the zero categories of the power dummies. This coding reflects our hypotheses on the presence of a powerful group.

However, one might question whether a top two quartiles centrality score is too high a bar for power among groups. While scores on the low end of the scale are certainly not as powerful as those on the high end, any eigenvector score suggests connections to other groups, and thus some social power. As a robustness check we provide in Table 4 a lower threshold for interest group power at a non-zero eigenvector centrality score in the amicus network. The results are substantively unchanged using the lower cutpoint. Thus, we feel confident that the dichotomous measure is sufficient for capturing the presence of a powerful group.

Table 4: Duration of Executive Nominations				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Confirmed	Withdrawn	Returned	
	b/se	b/se	b/se	
Number Croups in Summert	1 001	0.094	0.007	
Number Groups in Support	1.001	(0.984)	(0.997)	
	(0.004)	(0.028)	(0.012)	
Number Groups in Opposition	1.010***	0.965	0.987	
	(0.003)	(0.047)	(0.008)	
Powerful Group in Support	1.425***	0.746	0.625**	
-	(0.103)	(0.252)	(0.102)	
Powerful Group in Opposition	0.631**	1.403	2.022***	
	(0.096)	(0.660)	(0.321)	
Third Tier	0.781^{***}	1.277	1.122	
	(0.040)	(0.217)	(0.097)	
Reappointment	0.913	0.902	1.166	
	(0.057)	(0.183)	(0.105)	
Recess Appointment	0.144^{***}	6.858^{***}	2.774^{***}	
	(0.024)	(1.089)	(0.302)	
Divided Government	0.759^{***}	2.051^{***}	1.269^{***}	
	(0.035)	(0.276)	(0.085)	
Median Member Ideology	0.903^{***}	1.006	1.199^{***}	
	(0.019)	(0.073)	(0.040)	
Presidential Approval	1.306^{***}	0.770^{***}	0.861^{***}	
	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.026)	
Ag, Nutrition, Forestry	1.317^{**}	1.000	0.734	
	(0.130)	(0.410)	(0.131)	
Bank, Housing, Urban Affairs	1.171^{*}	1.936^{**}	0.677^{**}	
	(0.088)	(0.464)	(0.086)	
Commerce	1.184^{*}	1.264	0.810^{*}	
	(0.079)	(0.279)	(0.086)	
Energy, Natural Resources	1.140	1.470	0.808	
	(0.105)	(0.478)	(0.129)	
Environment, Public Works	0.972	1.576	0.934	
	(0.081)	(0.412)	(0.123)	
Finance	0.863	1.769^{*}	1.059	
	(0.066)	(0.393)	(0.117)	
Home Security, Gov Affairs	0.863	1.488	1.098	
•	(0.069)	(0.356)	(0.122)	
Indian Affairs	1.034	1.990°	0.717	
	(0.167)	(0.925)	(0.255)	
Rules, Administration	$0.798^{'}$	1.408°	1.221	
	(0.156)	(0.624)	(0.240)	
Small Business	$0.873^{'}$	1.801	1.138	
	(0.224)	(1.305)	(0.436)	
Veteran Affairs	1.434^{*}	2.143^{\prime}	0.386^{**}	
	(0.210)	(0.966)	(0.136)	
Two Committees	1.211*	1.552	0.401***	
	(0.117)	(0.571)	(0.102)	
	()	()	(
N	3845.000	3845.000	3845.000	
11	-20072.668	-1958.811	-7928.906	
aic	40189.336	3961.622	15901.813	
bic	40326.935	4099.222	16039.413	

Table 4: Duration of Executive Nominatic

5.3 Session Fixed Effects Models

The models in the manuscript contain a number of variables to control for the broader political landscape. In particular, we include a dummy variable for divided government. In this case we are particularly interested in the periods when two different parties controlled the Senate and the presidency, the 106^{th} , 107^{th} , 110^{th} , and the 114^{th} , thereby giving a one to those sessions and a zero otherwise. We also include Gallup presidential approval ratings, measured on the day before the Senate confirmation vote and standardized, to test whether the president's nominees fare better and are approved faster during times of higher approval. To account for any additional unmeasured confounding, we include here a model with congressional session fixed effects with the 115^{th} as the baseline. We do so instead of the variable for divided government, because including both results in substantial multicollinearity. The results in Table 5 are substantively consistent with the models in the manuscript, further suggesting the robustness of our results.

Table 5: Duration	of Executive I	Nominations			
	(1) (2) (3)				
	Confirmed	Withdrawn	Returned		
	b/se	b/se	b/se		
	-/	-/	-/		
Number Groups in Support	1.001	0.986	0.987		
	(0.004)	(0.030)	(0.020)		
Number Groups in Opposition	1.007^{**}	0.973	0.987		
	(0.003)	(0.035)	(0.008)		
Powerful Group in Support	1.483***	0.501	0.717		
	(0.160)	(0.272)	(0.154)		
Powerful Group in Opposition	0.524**	1 230	2 256***		
Towerran Group in Opposition	(0.123)	(0.760)	(0.476)		
Thind Tion	0.125)	1 252	(0.470)		
Timu Tiel	(0.020)	1.202	1.172		
D	(0.039)	(0.212)	(0.099)		
Reappointment	0.959	0.971	1.081		
	(0.061)	(0.204)	(0.099)		
Recess Appointment	0.136^{***}	7.838***	3.289^{***}		
	(0.023)	(1.333)	(0.402)		
Median Member Ideology	0.811^{***}	1.103	1.587^{***}		
	(0.035)	(0.153)	(0.146)		
Presidential Approval	1.551***	0.728^{*}	0.874^{*}		
	(0.084)	(0.114)	(0.060)		
Ag. Nutrition Forestry	1.469***	0.844	0.552**		
1.6, 1000000, 1010501y	(0.153)	(0.361)	(0.108)		
Bank Housing Urban Affairs	1 365***	1 666	0.102***		
Dank, Housing, UIDall Allall'S	(0.110)	(0.441)	(0.433)		
a	(0.110)	(0.441)	(0.070)		
Commerce	1.313***	1.172	0.618***		
	(0.090)	(0.265)	(0.073)		
Energy, Natural Resources	1.264*	1.339	0.600^{**}		
	(0.119)	(0.433)	(0.102)		
Environment, Public Works	1.015	1.515	0.773		
	(0.088)	(0.390)	(0.108)		
Finance	0.899	1.726^{*}	0.840		
	(0.072)	(0.392)	(0.107)		
Home Security Gov Affairs	0.912	1 371	0.806		
fielde Security, Gov finalis	(0.072)	(0.335)	(0.103)		
Indian Affairs	1 205	(0.555)	0.528		
Indian Analis	(0.107)	(0.789)	(0.182)		
	(0.197)	(0.782)	(0.165)		
Rules, Administration	0.859	1.348	0.905		
	(0.179)	(0.608)	(0.201)		
Small Business	0.894	1.680	0.794		
	(0.243)	(1.216)	(0.327)		
Veteran Affairs	1.563^{**}	1.891	0.302^{***}		
	(0.230)	(0.871)	(0.107)		
Two Committees	1.200	1.558	0.304^{***}		
	(0.126)	(0.563)	(0.080)		
106	0.502***	0.979	1.362		
	(0.071)	(0.461)	(0.237)		
107	0.573***	2.238	1.348		
- • •	(0,096)	(0.962)	(0.338)		
108	0 730*	0.594	1 910		
	(0.002)	(0.97 ^k)	(0.240)		
100	(0.093) 1.075***	0.401*	0.249)		
103	1.9(0	(0.154)	(0.079)		
110	(0.175)	(0.154)	(0.073)		
110	0.887	1.519	2.063**		
	(0.129)	(0.643)	(0.536)		
111	0.836	0.644	1.541		
	(0.112)	(0.300)	(0.399)		
112	0.592^{***}	1.758	1.352		
	(0.076)	(0.733)	(0.321)		
113	0.549 * * *	0.724	3.679^{***}		
	(0.073)	(0.331)	(0.828)		
114	0.380***	1.319	1.665***		
-	(0.061)	(0.551)	(0.248)		
115	1 000	1 000	1 000		
110	1.000	1.000	1.000		
	(.)	(.)	(.)		
Ν	3845.000	3845.000	3845.000		
aic	39955.801	3947.789	15787.486		
bic	40143 437	4135.425	15975 122		
	16	1100.120	100.0.100		

Table 5: Duration of Executive Nominations

5.4 Ideology Models

Instead of using DW-Nominate scores to control for committee median ideology as we do in the main text, here we check for the robustness of our results when controlling for two other ideological positions of key players in the nomination process. First we run a model with the committee chair ideology. Second, we control for the ideological distance between the president and the committee chair. Third, we control for the ideological homogeneity of the committee. For the first, we rely on DW-Nominate scores. For the second, we use presidential support scores for the committee chair (Edwards III, 1985). This is the number of times the committee chair's vote agreed with the presidents divided by the number of votes upon which the president took a position. Because the presidential support scores are provided for each year, we took the average support score for each congressional session (the average across the two years of the session). For the third, we simply take the absolute value of the difference between the median committee member and the chair, where larger values indicate greater ideological distance.

In the first column of Table 6, we include the committee chair ideology—instead of the median member ideology in the committee as in the manuscript models. The effect is insignificant and substantively small. In the second column we include presidential support scores. Because presidential support is highly correlated with divided government (r = .86) we exclude the latter in the model. The presidential support score is significant and positive. As expected, the closer the chair to the president the faster the confirmation, though the results are substantively very small. Since the presidential support scores are not available for the 114^{th} and 115^{th} congressional sessions, we chose not to include them in the main text, instead relying on the related committee median ideology and divided government variables. The results are robust to either set of controls.

In Table 7, we include the committee ideological homogeneity variable—instead of the median member ideology in the committee as in the manuscript models. We do so for all three risks, per an anonymous reviewer's hypothesis that return should be particularly responsive to ideological homogeneity on the committee. The effects of the new ideology variable are insignificant for both confirmed and returned. However, it is significant for withdrawn. The committee's ideological homogeneity decreases the time to withdraw. The key results are robust to including this variable.

Table 6: Duration of Executive Nominations				
	(1)	(2)		
	Confirmed	Confirmed		
	b/se	b/se		
	b/se	b/se		
Number Groups in Support	1.002	1.000		
	(0.004)	(0.004)		
Number Groups in Opposition	1 007**	1 010		
realiser ereaps in opposition	(0,002)	(0,009)		
Powerful Croup in Support	1 /32***	1 695***		
i oweriur Group in Support	(0.150)	(0.103)		
Democratical Community Operativities	(0.150)	(0.133)		
Poweriul Group in Opposition	(0.320^{-1})	(0.407)		
m) : 1 m;	(0.120)	(0.140)		
I hird I ier	0.784	0.725		
	(0.040)	(0.041)		
Reappointment	0.900	0.969		
	(0.057)	(0.064)		
Recess Appointment	0.143^{***}	0.130^{***}		
	(0.024)	(0.023)		
Divided Government	0.741^{***}			
	(0.035)			
Chair Ideology	1.010			
	(0.021)			
Presidential Approval	1.299***	1.239***		
i iosidonina rippiovai	(0.031)	(0.029)		
Ag Nutrition Forestry	1 260*	1 211**		
Ag, Nutrition, Porestry	(0.124)	(0.127)		
Donly Housing Unboy Affairs	(0.124)	(0.137) 1.960**		
Bank, Housing, Urban Allairs	1.050	(0.005)		
G	(0.076)	(0.095)		
Commerce	1.126	1.181*		
	(0.073)	(0.083)		
Energy, Natural Resources	1.081	1.124		
	(0.099)	(0.110)		
Environment, Public Works	0.913	0.975		
	(0.076)	(0.087)		
Finance	0.800^{**}	0.864		
	(0.060)	(0.068)		
Home Security, Gov Affairs	0.814**	0.865		
• •	(0.064)	(0.073)		
Indian Affairs	1.036	1.074		
	(0.171)	(0.184)		
Bules Administration	0 749	0.771		
itules, ituliinistration	(0.147)	(0.160)		
Small Business	0.837	(0.100)		
Sinan Dusiness	(0.213)	(0.721)		
Veterer Affeire	(0.213)	(0.210)		
veteran Anairs	1.332^{+}	1.240		
— — — —	(0.193)	(0.198)		
Two Committees	1.131	1.000		
	(0.109)	(.)		
Presidential Support Score		1.109^{***}		
		(0.025)		
N	2845 000	2162 000		
11	10910 004	3100.000 22000 577		
aic	40219.004	02990.077 22111 707		
DIC	40357.483	33111.794		

Table 7: Duration of Executive Nominations				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Confirmed	Withdrawn	Returned	
	b/se	b/se	b/se	
Number Groups in Support	1.002	0.992	0.988	
	(0.004)	(0.025)	(0.019)	
Number Groups in Opposition	1.007**	0.976	0.985	
	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.009)	
Powerful Group in Support	1.426^{***}	0.429	0.847	
	(0.149)	(0.239)	(0.183)	
Powerful Group in Opposition	0.521^{**}	1.301	2.500^{***}	
	(0.120)	(0.818)	(0.519)	
Third Tier	0.783^{***}	1.292	1.115	
	(0.040)	(0.220)	(0.097)	
Reappointment	0.901	0.885	1.192	
	(0.057)	(0.180)	(0.108)	
Recess Appointment	0.144^{***}	7.293***	2.698^{***}	
	(0.024)	(1.172)	(0.297)	
Divided Government	0.739***	2.103***	1.227**	
	(0.035)	(0.278)	(0.080)	
Committee Ideology Homogeneity	0.992	0.694**	1.026	
0, 0, ,	(0.036)	(0.089)	(0.058)	
Presidential Approval	1.302***	0.806***	0.869***	
	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.027)	
Ag. Nutrition, Forestry	1.261*	1.074	0.853	
	(0.124)	(0.427)	(0.149)	
Bank, Housing, Urban Affairs	1.054	1.970**	0.826	
Baim, Housing, Orbain Hilans	(0.076)	(0.431)	(0.101)	
Commerce	1 126	1 147	0.908	
e o i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	(0.074)	(0.254)	(0.097)	
Energy Natural Resources	1 078	1 376	0.896	
Energy, Natural Resources	(0.100)	(0.442)	(0.144)	
Environment Public Works	0.916	1 502	1.065	
Environment, i ubite works	(0.076)	(0.393)	(0.138)	
Financo	0.801**	1.655*	1 107	
Finance	(0.061)	(0.373)	(0.132)	
Home Security Cov Affairs	0.814**	(0.373)	(0.152) 1.216	
Home Security, Gov Anans	(0.014)	(0.323)	(0.137)	
Indian Affairs	(0.003)	(0.525) 1 702	(0.137)	
Indian Analis	(0.179)	(0.840)	(0.742)	
Dulas Administration	(0.172)	(0.849)	(0.203)	
Rules, Administration	(0.140)	1.300	(0.977)	
Crossell Development	(0.147)	(0.361)	(0.277)	
Sman Dusiness	0.850	1.(00)	1.334	
	(0.213)	(1.273)	(0.497)	
veteran Affairs	1.331"	2.112	0.434^{-1}	
The Committee	(0.193)	(0.943)	(0.151)	
Two Committees	1.130	1.405	0.451^{**}	
	(0.110)	(0.506)	(0.114)	
N	3845.000	3845.000	3845.000	
aic	40220.070	3953.651	15937.819	
bic	40357.670	4091.251	16075.419	

5.5 Gender Models

Approximately 30% of the appointments are women. As we show in our models below in Table 8, gender does not impact the duration of executive branch nominations. The effect is consistently insignificant and substantively small. It has no impact on the key variables of interest group involvement and does not improve model fit. We have therefore excluded it from the models in the text.

Table 8: Duration of Executive Nominations				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Confirmed	Withdrawn	Returned	
	b/se	b/se	b/se	
	5750	5/50	5750	
Number Groups in Support	1.002	0.992	0.987	
	(0.004)	(0.025)	(0.021)	
Number Groups in Opposition	1.007^{**}	0.975	0.985	
	(0.002)	(0.034)	(0.009)	
Powerful Group in Support	1.419^{***}	0.464	0.889	
	(0.146)	(0.256)	(0.189)	
Powerful Group in Opposition	0.546^{**}	1.304	2.379^{***}	
	(0.125)	(0.818)	(0.489)	
Third Tier	0.776^{***}	1.284	1.131	
	(0.040)	(0.218)	(0.098)	
Reappointment	0.910	0.900	1.173	
	(0.057)	(0.183)	(0.105)	
Recess Appointment	0.142***	6.905***	2.786***	
	(0.024)	(1.100)	(0.304)	
Divided Government	0.757***	2.042***	1.282***	
	(0.035)	(0.273)	(0.086)	
Median Member Ideology	0.905***	1.002	1.197***	
incutan inclusion facciogy	(0.020)	(0.073)	(0.040)	
Presidential Approval	1 301***	0 773***	0.863***	
r residentiai rippiovai	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.000)	
Fomalo	0.008	0.883	0.087	
Feinale	(0.938)	(0.127)	(0.937)	
Ag Nutrition Forestry	1 261**	(0.127)	(0.070)	
Ag, Nutrition, Forestry	(0.126)	(0.303)	(0.120)	
Paper Housing Urban Affairs	(0.130)	(0.394) 1 019**	(0.129)	
Dank, Housing, Orban Analis	(0.088)	(0.459)	(0.000)	
Commence	(0.000)	(0.436)	(0.065)	
Commerce	(0.070)	(0.975)	(0.000)	
En anna Nataral Daaraa	(0.079)	(0.275)	(0.086)	
Energy, Natural Resources	1.146	1.447	0.798	
	(0.106)	(0.471)	(0.128)	
Environment, Public Works	0.976	1.536	0.939	
	(0.082)	(0.402)	(0.124)	
Finance	0.858*	1.721*	1.062	
	(0.066)	(0.384)	(0.118)	
Home Security, Gov Affairs	0.872	1.475	1.080	
	(0.069)	(0.351)	(0.120)	
Indian Affairs	1.072	1.994	0.706	
	(0.175)	(0.927)	(0.251)	
Rules, Administration	0.791	1.401	1.249	
	(0.157)	(0.624)	(0.243)	
Small Business	0.868	1.759	1.127	
	(0.223)	(1.288)	(0.435)	
Veteran Affairs	1.419^{*}	2.118	0.385^{**}	
	(0.208)	(0.957)	(0.135)	
Two Committees	1.191	1.530	0.401^{***}	
	(0.118)	(0.562)	(0.101)	
N	3845 000	3845 000	3845 000	
	40200 569	2061 464	3040.000 15011.024	
aic	40200.008	0301.404 4105 210	16055 799	
DIC	40544.422	4100.318	10099.788	

Exponentiated	coefficients

5.6 Strategy-Specific Models

In Table 9, we model the time to confirmation separately depending on the location of interest group support and opposition: news media or committee documents. In the manuscript, we create an additive index for support or opposition across these measures. The strategy-specific results show little departure from the additive index approach in the manuscript. Generally, the news media and committee document variables are in the same direction and of similar magnitude and significance.

Table 9: Duration of Executive Nominations				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Confirmed	Withdrawn	Returned	
	b/se	b/se	b/se	
Num News Groups in Support	1.002	1 043	0.652***	
frum froms Groups in Support	(0.006)	(0.034)	(0.079)	
Num Comm Groups in Support	1 000	0.054)	1.006	
Nulli Collini Groups in Support	(0.006)	(0.061)	(0.006)	
Num Nows Crouns in Opposition	(0.000)	0.005	(0.000)	
Nulli News Groups in Opposition	(0.002)	(0.995)	(0.975)	
Num Comm Cround in Opposition	(0.002) 1.050**	0.0011)	(0.027)	
Nulli Collini Groups in Opposition	(0.018)	(0,000)	(0.930)	
Demonful Name Course in Course at	(0.016)	(0.000)	(0.019)	
Powerful News Group in Support	1.590	(0.123)	2.095	
Demonful General General in Second	(0.159)	(0.157)	(0.525)	
Powerful Comm Group in Support	1.600***	1.040	0.513	
	(0.286)	(1.098)	(0.200)	
Powerful News Group in Opposition	0.627	1.535	2.572***	
	(0.159)	(0.908)	(0.574)	
Powerful Comm Group in Opposition	0.159	$2.540e + 34^{***}$	5.170^{*}	
	(0.150)	(1.110e+35)	(3.394)	
Third Tier	0.775^{***}	1.272	1.119	
	(0.040)	(0.219)	(0.097)	
Reappointment	0.912	0.903	1.162	
	(0.057)	(0.184)	(0.104)	
Recess Appointment	0.142^{***}	6.963^{***}	2.721^{***}	
	(0.024)	(1.108)	(0.299)	
Divided Government	0.763^{***}	2.050 * * *	1.254^{***}	
	(0.035)	(0.274)	(0.084)	
Median Member Ideology	0.904^{***}	1.006	1.200***	
	(0.020)	(0.073)	(0.040)	
Presidential Approval	1.302***	0.773***	0.861^{***}	
	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.027)	
Ag, Nutrition, Forestry	1.374**	0.984	0.721	
	(0.137)	(0.403)	(0.130)	
Bank, Housing, Urban Affairs	1.188*	1.932**	0.671**	
, 0,	(0.089)	(0.460)	(0.085)	
Commerce	1.206^{**}	1.250	0.828	
	(0.080)	(0.276)	(0.088)	
Energy, Natural Resources	1.155	1.458	0.812	
0,	(0.107)	(0.476)	(0.130)	
Environment, Public Works	0.979	1.559	0.949	
	(0.082)	(0.407)	(0.125)	
Finance	0.862	1 751*	1 077	
	(0.066)	(0.301)	(0.121)	
Home Security Gov Affairs	0.866	1 450	1 001	
nome occurry, Gov Anano	(0.070)	(0.350)	(0.193)	
Indian Affairs	1.078	1.045	(0.123)	
ingian Allalis	(0.176)	(0.007)	(0.240)	
Rules Administration	(0.170)	(0.907)	(0.249) 1.961	
nules, Administration	(0.150)	1.390	1.201	
Con all Darain and	(0.156)	(0.620)	(0.245)	
Small Business	0.895	1.780	1.130	
	(0.237)	(1.294)	(0.434)	
Veteran Affairs	1.429*	2.132	0.378**	
	(0.210)	(0.960)	(0.133)	
Two Committees	1.200	1.577	0.408***	
	(0.119)	(0.577)	(0.103)	
N	3845.000	3845.000	3845.000	
11	-20073.038	-1954.301	-7918.223	
aic	40198.076	3960.602	15888.446	
bic	40360.694	4123.220	16051.064	
510	10000.004	1120.220	10001.004	

Table 9:	Duration	of	Executive	Nominations
Table 0.	Daration	01	Linouuivo	1,0111110010110

5.7 Interaction Models

It is possible that the effect of organized interest support is conditional on organized interest opposition, and vice versa. We therefore test the potential effects of the interaction of the group variables—both number and power—on time to confirmation in Table 10. The interaction effects are consistently insignificant. In addition, the key results are robust to the inclusion of the inter-action(s).

	(1) Confirmed b/se	(2) Confirmed b/se	(3) Confirm b/se
Number Groups in Support	1.006	1.004	1.006
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004
Number Groups in Opposition	1.010***	1.008**	1.010*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Number Interaction	0.999		0.999
	(0.001)		(0.001)
Powerful Group in Support	1.384^{**}	1.418^{***}	1.396^{*}
	(0.142)	(0.146)	(0.145)
Powerful Group in Opposition	0.601^{*}	0.622^{*}	0.624
	(0.136)	(0.149)	(0.149)
Third Tier	0.776^{***}	0.777^{***}	0.777^{*}
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Reappointment	0.909	0.909	0.909
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Recess Appointment Divided Government	0.142^{***}	0.143^{***}	0.143^{*}
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
	0.759^{***}	0.758^{***}	0.759^{*}
Median Member Ideology	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
	0.905^{***}	0.905^{***}	0.905^{*}
Presidential Approval	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
	1.302***	1.301***	1.302^{*}
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030
Ag, Nutrition, Forestry	1.367**	1.364**	1.366*
Bank, Housing, Urban Affairs	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.136
	1.183*	1.182*	1.182
Commerce	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088
	1.200^{++}	1.200^{++}	1.200*
Energy, Natural Resources	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079
	1.144	1.144	1.144
Environment, Public Works	(0.100)	(0.100)	0.100
	(0.082)	(0.970)	(0.085
Finance	(0.082)	(0.062)	0.062
	(0.066)	(0.059)	0.800
Home Security, Gov Affairs	(0.000)	(0.000)	0.000
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.070
Indian Affairs	1.069	(0.003)	1 060
	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.174
Rules, Administration	0.792	0.792	0 792
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.157
Small Business	0.835	0.849	0.836
	(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.218
Veteran Affairs	1.423*	1.423*	1.424
	(0.208)	(0.209)	(0.209
Two Committees	1.192	1.191	1.192
	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.118
Power Interaction	/	0.374	0.657
		(0.291)	(0.490)
N	3845 000	3845 000	3945 0
	3843.000 40107 329	3643.000 40108 011	3643.U 40109.0
aic	40191.002	40130.011	40190.5

5.8 Flexible Parametric Competing Risk Models

The Cox model is the dominant model in the other social sciences as well as medicine (survival models) and engineering (reliability models), while political science is an outlier with its nod to parametric models. The Cox model is strongly preferred due to the potential, indeed probable, untenable distributional assumptions that parametric models make about the hazard function, see (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004, especially chapter four). While one can test nesting parametric assumptions within models, the big payoff is not having to make these assumptions for the Cox model. However, we include the parametric competing risk model results here for comparison. The flexible parametric survival approach uses a spline to model the baseline distribution function with maximum likelihood for the parameter estimation (Royston and Parmar, 2002; Mozumder, Rutherford and Lambert, 2017). Scholars must choose the model and the number of knots for the spline function for the parametric models, which is another modeling choice that does not have to be made for the Cox model. The results in Table 11 are for time to confirmation from Weibull, log-normal and log-logistic fit models, respectively. Across the specifications the major findings are robust in direction and size. Only for the Weibull does the power measure for support lose statistical significance. In addition, the weaker finding on numbers in opposition loses significance.

Table 11: Duration of Executive Nominations				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed	
	b/se	b/se	b/se	
Number Groups in Support	1.000	1.003	1.006	
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	
Number Groups in Opposition	1.009	1.006	1.008	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	
Powerful Group in Support	1.196	1.243^{*}	1.400^{*}	
	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.230)	
Powerful Group in Opposition	0.495^{**}	0.718^{*}	0.544^{*}	
	(0.106)	(0.120)	(0.166)	
Third Tier	0.754^{***}	0.760^{***}	0.628^{***}	
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.048)	
Reappointment	0.851^{*}	0.876^{*}	0.763^{**}	
	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.073)	
Recess Appointment	0.176^{***}	0.223***	0.074^{***}	
	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.016)	
Divided Government	0.737^{***}	0.835^{***}	0.735^{***}	
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.049)	
Median Member Ideology	0.881^{***}	0.938***	0.911* [*]	
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.030)	
Presidential Approval	1.368***	1.290***	1.542***	
11	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.048)	
Ag. Nutrition. Forestry	1.394***	1.359***	1.697***	
8,, ,,	(0.135)	(0.121)	(0.265)	
Bank, Housing, Urban Affairs	1.187^{*}	1.138	1.256^{*}	
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(0.089)	(0.075)	(0.142)	
Commerce	1.282***	1.198**	1.356**	
	(0.083)	(0.069)	(0.134)	
Energy, Natural Resources	1.238^{*}	1.097	1.160	
	(0.113)	(0.089)	(0.160)	
Environment, Public Works	1.063	0.989	1.028	
,,,	(0.088)	(0.072)	(0.126)	
Finance	0.774**	0.809**	0.616***	
	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.074)	
Home Security, Gov Affairs	0.855	0.836*	0.715**	
Home Scourtey, Got Hinding	(0.070)	(0.059)	(0.086)	
Indian Affairs	1.272	0.904	0.880	
	(0.234)	(0.151)	(0.227)	
Bules Administration	0.621**	0.805	0.669	
reaces, realinistration	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.180)	
Small Business	0.880	0.841	0.785	
Sman Dasmoss	(0.247)	(0.205)	(0.330)	
Veteran Affairs	1 612***	1 312*	1 620*	
veterali mans	(0.210)	(0.159)	(0.327)	
Two Committees	1 165	0.970	0.951	
1 wo committees	(0.110)	(0.092)	(0.148)	
Spline	3 050***	2 556***	5 311***	
ohune	(0.051)	2.000	(0.144)	
	(0.001)	(0.034)	(0.144)	
Ν	3845.000	3845.000	3845.000	
aic	9406.117	9124.614	9059.900	
bic	9556.225	9274.723	9210.008	

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