Online Appendix

"Rising Seas, Rising Concerns: How Climate Change Vulnerability Shapes Opinions Towards Policy"

Contents

A Datasets

A.1 Lucid

Lucid is an automated marketplace that connects researchers with respondents from a variety of network survey panel companies. Many of these are double opt-in panels where respondents are invited to partake in research via emails, push notifications, in-app pop-ups, or other means. Respondents are incentivized in a variety of ways depending on the supplier. Lucid takes a variety of steps to increase quality of respondents from these survey panel providers including: 1) blocking users from taking surveys multiple times via cookies, IP addresses, or other unique identifiers; 2) screening the quality of respondents through attention check questions and open-ended questions; 3) using third party bot detection services like Google's reCaptcha to block bots; and 4) publishing and providing information on the quality of all their data suppliers. While existing research finds Lucid samples to be of high quality (Coppock and Green, 2016; Coppock and Mcclellan, 2019), and when properly weighted, provide samples that are similar in quality to respected survey respondent panels like Pew's American Trends Panel (Tausanovitch et al., 2021), we took extra steps to ensure data quality including additional attention screeners at the front end of the survey to filter out inattentive respondents before they could count toward our demographic quotas (see Aronow, Kalla, Orr, and Ternovski 2020) (https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/8sbe4/).

Lucid respondents were paid according to the policies of the vendors that recruited our sample.[26] The participant pool was benchmarked to be representative of the US adult population. No respondents or groups differentially benefited or were harmed by our research which presented no more harm than one reasonably faces in their everyday lives. Further, our studies did not include elements of deception and respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their responses.

A.2 Nationscape

Nationscape is a large, weekly online survey that was conducted by Lucid for the Democracy Fund and researchers at UCLA and that was designed to collect weekly snapshots of the American electorate throughout the 2019-2020 primary and general elections. This cross-sectional survey was in the field every day of the week and includes weekly collections of about N 6,100 responses. While the sample is opt-in, a representativeness assessment of the data finds that the samples are comparable to those collected by well-known pollsters like Pew and YouGov (Tausanovitch et al., 2021). More information on the survey can be

26. see https://support.lucidhq.com/s/article/Sample-Sourcing-FAQs for more information on compensation.

found at https://www.voterstudygroup.org/nationscape and see above for more information on Lucid.

A.3 Cooperative Election Study

The Cooperative Election Study (formerly Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)) is a large opt-in internet panel survey administered by YouGov/Polimetrix. Surveys were conducted between November 6 and December 5 2019. The YouGov sample selection follows a two-stage sample-matching process. First, YouGov draws a stratified random sample from the American Community Survey (ACS). This sample is then matched to members of the YouGov/Polimetrix opt-in panel, such that the resulting panel looks the same on observables as the national population. The resulting survey includes N=18,000 completed interviews and is weighted to be representative of the US adult population.

B Key Variables and Procedures

B.1 Independent Variable

Our primary independent variable is sea-level rise susceptibility as calculated by scientists at Rhodium Group for ProPublica. These estimates are based on proportion of a county that is below the high tide mark based on sea-level rise projections for the year 2100.[27].

Respondents were cross-walked from their zipcode to their county using the US Government Housing and Urban Development Office of Policy Development and Research (PD&R) HUD-USPS ZIP code crosswalk. Respondents who lived in zipcodes that crossed county boundaries were assigned to counties that contained a larger proportion of the land area of that given zipcode.[28].

As a robustness check, we also use alternate county-level SLR measures from Moodys Rating Agency and NOAA, and an alternate measure at the zipcode level collected and estimated by the Union of Concerned Scientists and based on Zillow data on home risk due to sea-level rise. The measure is the projected proportion of homes in a given zipcode that are at risk of flooding due to sea-level rise by 2100. For more information see here and here.

B.2 Dependent Variables

B.2.1 Policy Attitudes

Respondents were asked "Please indicate how strongly you favor or oppose the following policies?" All items had a 4-pt Likert response categories ranging from strongly favor (4) to strongly oppose (1). The individual questions are:

- Enacting a carbon tax on heavily polluting industries
- Increasing federal fuel efficiency standards for motor vehicles
- Banning use of single-use plastics
- Increase research funding on meat alternatives
- Increase gasoline taxes
- Increase investment to transition to 100 percent electricity generation from renewable energy sources

27. More information can be found at https://projects.propublica.org/climate-migration/
28. More information can be found at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/usps_crosswalk.html

- Build national energy efficient smart grid
- Increase investment in projects to capture climate damaging gases

These items were combined into an additive scale (mean = 0.65; sd=0.22) and re-scaled to range between 0 and 1. The items are internally consistent (Cronbach's alpha=0.86) and load well on a single factor. Below are the factor loadings and a correlation matrix for all of the items.

Table B1: Factor Loadings

Variable	Factor Loading
Fuel Efficiency	0.72
Smart Grid	0.69
Carbon Tax	0.72
Plastics	0.58
Capture CO2	0.70
Clean Energy	0.76
Meat Alternatives	0.58
Gas Tax	0.52

Note: exploratory factor analysis using varimax rotation. The first factor explains 44% of the variance in the data.

Table B2: Correlation Table Individual Policies

	Fuel	Grid	Tax	Plastics	CO2	Energy	Meat	Gas Tax
Fuel Efficiency								
Smart Grid	0.52							
Carbon Tax	0.52	0.5						
Plastics	0.43	0.40	0.42					
Capture CO2	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.37				
Clean Energy	0.53	0.55	0.56	0.41	0.55			
Meat Alternatives	0.40	0.33	0.40	0.36	0.39	0.44		
Gas Tax	0.38	0.28	0.37	0.33	0.30	0.39	0.46	

We note that all of these policy items are often proposed as potential solutions in climate policy (e.g., in the Green New Deal legislation) and would be projected to have a significant impact on climate changing emissions. While maybe not immediately obvious, plastic refining, extraction, transport, and incineration, for example, emits hundreds of millions of

metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.[29] Similarly, reducing meat consumption would reduce omissions; studies estimate that global greenhouse gas emissions from animal-based foods are twice those of plant based foods.[30].

B.3 Ballot Propositions

- California Proposition 23, Suspension of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Law Initiative (2010). A "yes" vote supported suspending Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32), which required greenhouse gas emissions to be reduced to 1990 levels by 2020, until California's unemployment rate decreases to 5.5 percent or less for four consecutive quarters. A "no" vote opposed suspending Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32), which required greenhouse gas emissions to be reduced to 1990 levels by 2020. The proposition received only 38.46 percent support. For more, see https://bit.ly/3NV4QeT

- Washington Carbon Emission Tax and Sales Tax Reduction, Initiative 732 (2016). A "yes" vote supported imposing a carbon emission tax on the sale or use of certain fossil fuels and fossil-fuel-generated electricity. A "no" vote opposed this proposal, keeping the tax structure unchanged. The initiative failed with only 40.75 percent support. For more, see https://bit.ly/3Hq2jXm

- Florida Solar Energy Subsidies and Personal Solar Use, Amendment 1 (2016). A "yes" vote supported adding a section in the state constitution giving residents of Florida the right to own or lease solar energy equipment for personal use while also enacting constitutional protection for any state or local law, ensuring that residents who do not produce solar energy can abstain from subsidizing its production. A "no" vote opposed constitutionalizing the right to own or lease solar equipment and the protection of laws preventing subsidization of solar energy, thereby leaving the personal use of solar power protected as a right by state statute and not by the constitution. The measure failed to reach the necessary 60 percent support threshold, receiving just 50.79 percent support of voters. For more, see https://bit.ly/3Ojkzny.

B.4 Moderators

Willingness to move:

- "How willing would you be to move to a different state to find a new job?" (1=Very willing, 2=somewhat willing, 3=not too willing, 4=not at all willing)

29. See this link for more.
30. See, for example, Xu et al. **xu:2021**)

Community Ties:

- Below are some statements. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each: "I have deep ties to my current community" (1=Strongly disagree, 2=Somewhat disagree, 3=Somewhat agree, 4=Strongly agree)

Place-Based Identity:
"Thinking about the area within a mile of your place of residence, please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements":

- "This area is a reflection of me"
- "I don't really fit in with the people who live here"
- "I would move somewhere else if I could"
- "This is my favorite place to be"
- "I really miss it when I am away for too long"
- "I feel happiest when I am here"
- "My job is dependent on being here"

All of the identity scale items had a 4-pt Likert response outcome that ranged from 1=strongly agree to 4=strongly disagree (or vise-versa).

C Regression Tables & Other Robustness Checks

Table C1: Susceptibility and Policy Support

	Support Policy	Support Policy
Intercept	0.62***	0.80***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Susceptibility	0.19***	0.10***
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Party ID (R)		−0.16***
		(0.01)
Conservative		−0.20***
		(0.03)
Age		−0.04**
		(0.02)
Female		−0.01
		(0.01)
College		0.03***
		(0.01)
Income 60-125k		−0.01
		(0.01)
Income Over 125k		0.02*
		(0.01)
Income Missing		−0.01
		(0.01)
White		0.02***
		(0.01)
R^2	0.02	0.26
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.26
Num. obs.	2846	2845
RMSE	0.21	0.19
N Clusters	932	932

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level.

Table C2: Susceptibility and Policy Support

	Support Policy	Support Policy	Support Policy	Support Policy
Intercept	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Susceptibility Fires	−0.00			
	(0.02)			
Susceptibility Heat		−0.01		
		(0.02)		
Susceptibility Wet Bulb			0.01	
			(0.02)	
Susceptibility Crop Yields				−0.00
				(0.01)
Party ID (R)	−0.17***	−0.16***	−0.17***	−0.17***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Conservative	−0.20***	−0.20***	−0.20***	−0.20***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	−0.04**	−0.04**	−0.04**	−0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Missing	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
White	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
Adj. R^2	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Num. obs.	2845	2845	2845	2845
RMSE	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
N Clusters	932	932	932	932

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level.

Table C3: Susceptibility and Policy Support

	Support Policy	Support Policy	Support Policy	Support Policy
Intercept	0.80***	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Susceptibility	0.10***	0.08***	0.09***	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party ID (R)	−0.16***	−0.16***	−0.16***	−0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative	−0.20***	−0.21***	−0.21***	−0.21***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	−0.04**	−0.03*	−0.03**	−0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.02*	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Missing	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
White	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pct White		−0.02	−0.02	−0.03
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pct College		0.07**	0.08**	0.08**
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pct Unemp		−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Median Income		−0.08*	−0.08*	−0.08*
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Population Density			−0.00	0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Total Population				−0.00
				(0.00)
R^2	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
Adj. R^2	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
Num. obs.	2845	2845	2845	2845
RMSE	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
N Clusters	932	932	932	932

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level.

Table C4: Sensitivity Analysis

Outcome: *policy_scale*

Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y\sim D\|\mathbf{X}}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1,\alpha=0.05}$
sea_level_rise	0.095	0.023	4.112	0.6%	7.4%	4%
df = 2834		*Bound (1x pid7_r)*: $R^2_{Y\sim Z\|\mathbf{X},D} = 6.6\%$, $R^2_{D\sim Z\|\mathbf{X}} = 0.5\%$				

Table C5: Susceptibility and Policy Support

	Support Policy
Intercept	0.80***
	(0.01)
Susceptibility (Moodys)	0.05***
	(0.02)
Party ID (R)	−0.17***
	(0.01)
Conservative	−0.20***
	(0.03)
Age	−0.04**
	(0.02)
Female	−0.01
	(0.01)
College	0.03***
	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	−0.01
	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.02
	(0.01)
Income Missing	−0.01
	(0.01)
White	0.02***
	(0.01)
R^2	0.26
Adj. R^2	0.26
Num. obs.	2972
RMSE	0.19
N Clusters	974

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level.

Table C6: Susceptibility and Policy Support

	Support Policy	Support Policy
Intercept	0.633***	0.802***
	(0.005)	(0.014)
Susceptibility (NOAA)	0.127**	0.049
	(0.036)	(0.024)
Party ID (R)		−0.168***
		(0.014)
Conservative		−0.197***
		(0.026)
Age		−0.035**
		(0.016)
Female		−0.010
		(0.007)
College		0.034***
		(0.008)
Income 60-125k		−0.014
		(0.009)
Income Over 125k		0.016
		(0.012)
Income Missing		−0.007
		(0.012)
White		0.022***
		(0.008)
R^2	0.020	0.259
Adj. R^2	0.020	0.256
Num. obs.	2973	2972
RMSE	0.215	0.187
N Clusters	974	974

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level. Susceptibility was calculated using spatial interpolation to estimate the number of housing units (in 100,000s) that exist within NOAA projected sea-level rise zones (found at https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/tools/slr.html) within each county. These housing units include single-family homes, apartment buildings, groups of rooms or single rooms intended as separate living quarters. For more on the definitions see: https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/definitions.pdf

Table C7: Zip-level Susceptibility and Policy Support

	Support Policy	Support Policy
Intercept	0.64^{***}	0.81^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Susceptibility (Zip)	0.10^{**}	0.09^{**}
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Party ID (R)		-0.17^{***}
		(0.01)
Conservative		-0.20^{***}
		(0.02)
Age		-0.04^{**}
		(0.02)
Female		-0.01^{*}
		(0.01)
College		0.04^{***}
		(0.01)
Income 60-125k		-0.01
		(0.01)
Income Over 125k		0.02^{*}
		(0.01)
Income Missing		-0.01
		(0.01)
White		0.02^{**}
		(0.01)
R^2	0.00	0.26
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.25
Num. obs.	2977	2976
RMSE	0.22	0.19
N Clusters	2477	2477

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at zip code level.

Table C8: Susceptibility and Policy Support (Replication)

	Support Policy
Intercept	0.91^{***}
	(0.02)
Susceptibility	0.07^{***}
	(0.02)
Party ID (R)	-0.03^{***}
	(0.00)
Conservative	-0.06^{***}
	(0.01)
Age	-0.00^{***}
	(0.00)
Female	-0.02^{***}
	(0.01)
College	0.03^{***}
	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	0.00
	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.04^{***}
	(0.01)
Income Missing	-0.03^{*}
	(0.02)
White	0.02^{***}
	(0.01)
Wave 2	-0.01
	(0.01)
Wave 3	-0.00
	(0.01)
R^2	0.32
Adj. R^2	0.32
Num. obs.	3036
RMSE	0.19
N Clusters	1006

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level. Original replication with Lucid.

Table C9: Susceptibility and Policy Support (Replication)

	Support Green New Deal
Intercept	0.82^{***}
	(0.01)
Susceptibility	0.11^{***}
	(0.02)
Party ID (R)	-0.04^{***}
	(0.00)
Conservative	-0.10^{***}
	(0.00)
Age	-0.00^{***}
	(0.00)
Female	-0.07^{***}
	(0.00)
College	0.06^{***}
	(0.00)
Family Income	0.00^{***}
	(0.00)
White	0.01^{***}
	(0.00)
R^2	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.14
Num. obs.	131683
RMSE	0.45
N Clusters	2606

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Linear probability model coefficients with hetereoskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. Outcome is a dichotomous measure of support for Green New Deal from Nationscape Survey Data https://www.voterstudygroup.org/data/nationscape. For more, see Tausanovitch and Vavreck (2021) and Holliday et al. (2021).

Table C10: Susceptibility and Policy Support (Replication)

	Policy Scale	Reg Carbon	Renewables	EPA
Intercept	1.26***	1.26***	1.22***	1.30***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Susceptibility	0.06***	0.08***	0.04**	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party ID (R)	−0.05***	−0.05***	−0.05***	−0.06***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Conservative	−0.11***	−0.11***	−0.11***	−0.12***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Male	−0.05***	−0.07***	−0.06***	−0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.01*	0.01	−0.00	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Family Income	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00*	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
White	0.01*	0.01*	0.02***	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.36	0.26	0.24	0.32
Adj. R^2	0.36	0.26	0.24	0.32
Num. obs.	14703	14709	14714	14717
RMSE	0.33	0.40	0.42	0.40
N Clusters	1807	1807	1808	1808

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

OLS regression coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level. Column 1 outcome is an additive scale of dichotomous support for 3 items: "Give the Environmental Protection Agency power to regulate Carbon Dioxide emissions", "Require that each state use a minimum amount of renewable fuels (wind, solar, and hydroelectric) in the generation of electricity even if electricity prices increase a little" and "Strengthen the Environmental Protection Agency enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs U.S. jobs". Columns 2 through 4 use each of these items separately as the dependent variables.

Figure C1: Susceptibility to SLR and YPCCC County-Level Environmental Attitudes



Note: Sea-level rise and support for each outcome using YPCCC aggregate county-level data. Coefficient with 95% confidence interval from heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. Pooled effect estimated using a random-effects meta-analysis. Using all county-level climate opinion questions from the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication Climate Opinion Map (Marlon et al 2023) that dealt with political outcomes, we regress each county climate attitude outcome on our ProPublica measure of sea-level rise controlling for 2019 American Community Survey measured county-level covariates. Our controls include the same demographic and political variables or close proxies: population density, percent of county population over 25 with at least a 4-year college degree, percent of county between 18 and 34, 35 to 64 and over 65, percent of county that is non-Hispanic white, percent of households in the county with combined family incomes between 20k and 50k dollars, 50k and 100k, and over 100k, and finally the percent of the county that voted Democratic for President in 2016. Variables include `president`: Estimated percentage who think the President themselves should be doing more/much more to address global warming; `localofficial`: Estimated percentage who think their local officials should be doing more/much more to address global warming; `prioritycleanenergy`: Estimated percentage who say developing sources of clean energy should be a high or very high priority for the president and Congress; `generaterenewable`: Estimated percentage who somewhat or strongly support generating renewable energy on public land in the U.S; `rebates`: Estimated percentage who somewhat/strongly support providing tax rebates for people who purchase energy-efficient vehicles or solar panels; `reducetax`: Estimated percentage who somewhat/strongly support requiring fossil fuel companies to pay a carbon tax and use the money to reduce other taxes (such as income tax) by an equal amount; `regulate`: Estimated percentage who somewhat/strongly support regulating CO2 as a pollutant; `fundrenewables`: Estimated percentage who somewhat/strongly support funding research into renewable energy sources. Data can be found at https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us/

Table C11: Falsification Tests

	BlueLM	Racial Resentment	FT Repubs	FT Prius	FT Pickup
Intercept	5.06***	1.16***	1.44***	3.18***	2.39***
	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Susceptibility	−0.18	−0.03	0.27	0.20	−0.07
	(0.40)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Party ID (R)	−0.55***	1.17***	1.37***	−0.37***	0.25***
	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Conservative	−1.13***	1.11***	0.70***	−0.24***	0.45***
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Age	−0.77***	1.09***	−0.31***	0.16*	0.03
	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Female	0.06	0.09**	−0.03	−0.03	−0.08**
	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College	−0.19*	−0.24***	−0.02	0.08**	−0.09***
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Income 60-125k	−0.24**	0.08	0.04	−0.06*	0.02
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Income Over 125k	−0.84***	−0.18**	0.37***	0.04	0.25***
	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Income Missing	0.29*	−0.03	−0.09*	−0.04	−0.02
	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
White	−0.40***	0.26***	0.04	0.04	0.09**
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
R^2	0.10	0.32	0.38	0.06	0.08
Adj. R^2	0.10	0.32	0.37	0.06	0.08
Num. obs.	2849	2849	2849	2850	2845
RMSE	2.16	1.20	0.83	0.79	0.79
N Clusters	933	933	933	933	933

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level.

Table C12: Falsification Tests

	Altruism	Future Orient	Anthropocentric	Nature	Recreation
Intercept	0.40^{***}	0.67^{***}	0.69^{***}	0.70^{***}	0.27^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Susceptibility	-0.14^{***}	-0.01	0.01	-0.07^{***}	-0.05^{**}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Party ID (R)	0.05^{**}	-0.04^{***}	-0.06^{***}	0.02	0.06^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative	-0.08^{***}	0.04^{**}	-0.21^{***}	-0.03	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.11^{***}	0.02	0.01	0.09^{***}	-0.20^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	0.02	0.04^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.02^{**}	-0.01^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.03^{**}	0.03^{***}	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	-0.01	0.02^{**}	-0.02	-0.02^{**}	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	-0.01	0.08^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.05^{***}	0.06^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Income Missing	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
White	0.05^{***}	0.01	0.04^{***}	0.06^{***}	0.05^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.13	0.06	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.04	0.13	0.05	0.09
Num. obs.	2850	2848	2848	2848	2850
RMSE	0.26	0.19	0.22	0.20	0.18
N Clusters	933	931	933	933	933

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level.

Table C13: Robustness Checks: Living Near Water

	Policy Scale	Policy Scale
Intercept	0.27^{***}	0.81^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Coastal	-0.02^{**}	
	(0.01)	
Pct Water		0.03
		(0.03)
Party ID (R)	0.06^{***}	-0.17^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative	-0.00	-0.20^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.03)
Age	-0.21^{***}	-0.04^{**}
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Female	-0.02^{**}	-0.01^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.01	0.04^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.06^{***}	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Born Again Christian	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
White	0.05^{***}	0.02^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.09	0.26
Adj. R^2	0.09	0.25
Num. obs.	2981	2972
RMSE	0.18	0.19
N Clusters	976	974

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level.

Figure C2: SLR Susceptibility and Distance from Coast



Note: SLR Susceptibility coefficient based on models estimated with sample restrictions based on each respondent county's distance from a coastal county. To estimate models we first calculated the distance from each county's centroid and the centroid of the nearest coastal county in miles. We then subset our survey data to just respondents living within 50 miles, 100 miles, 150 miles, etc. from a coastal county and re-ran our models. Numbers are sample size N for each model.

Table C14: Robustness Checks: State and Region FEs

	Policy Scale	Policy Scale
Intercept	0.80^{***}	0.76^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.03)
Susceptibility	0.09^{***}	0.09^{**}
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Party ID (R)	-0.16^{***}	-0.16^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative	-0.20^{***}	-0.20^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	-0.04^{**}	-0.04^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.03^{***}	0.03^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Missing	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
White	0.02^{***}	0.02^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Region FEs?	✓	
State FEs?		✓
R^2	0.26	0.27
Adj. R^2	0.26	0.26
Num. obs.	2845	2845
RMSE	0.19	0.19
N Clusters	932	932

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level.

Figure C3: Leave One Out Analysis



Note: Each dot represents the OLS coefficient with 95% confidence intervals extracted from main model estimated dropping the state labeled on the Y-axis.

Table C15: Robustness Checks: Coastal Interaction

	Policy Scale
Intercept	0.80^{***}
	(0.01)
Susceptibility	0.10^{***}
	(0.03)
West Coast	0.00
	(0.02)
Party ID (R)	-0.16^{***}
	(0.01)
Conservative	-0.20^{***}
	(0.03)
Age	-0.04^{**}
	(0.02)
Female	-0.01
	(0.01)
College	0.03^{***}
	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	-0.01
	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.02^{*}
	(0.01)
Born Again Christian	-0.01
	(0.01)
White	0.02^{***}
	(0.01)
SLR * West Coast	-0.04
	(0.09)
R^2	0.26
Adj. R^2	0.26
Num. obs.	2845
RMSE	0.19
N Clusters	932

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level.

Table C16: Robustness Checks: Controlling for Hurricane Susceptibility and Category 3+ Exposure

	Policy Scale	Policy Scale
Intercept	0.80***	0.80***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Susceptibility	0.09**	0.10***
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Hurricane Incidence	0.01	
	(0.05)	
Hurricane Cat 3		−0.04
		(0.04)
Party ID (R)	−0.16***	−0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative	−0.20***	−0.20***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	−0.04**	−0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Born Again Christian	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
White	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.26	0.26
Adj. R^2	0.26	0.26
Num. obs.	2845	2845
RMSE	0.19	0.19
N Clusters	932	932

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level. Column 1 data from FEMA hurricane annualized frequency value that represents the average number of recorded hurricane hazard occurrences (events) per year over the period of record (169.9 years for the Atlantic Basin and 69.04 years for the Pacific Basin). Column 2 data from the NOAA National Hurricane Center (www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/) that included information on snapshots of the location, wind speeds, central pressure, and size of all known tropical cyclones and subtropical cyclones. This database, known as HURDAT2, has been used by geographers to study the localized impact of major storms in the United States. Using this data, we first subset it to observations of hurricanes category 3 and above after 1970 and then reverse geocoded each temporal snapshot of the latitude and longitude of the storms. For those that maintained this power as they moved over land, we recorded the county and state of landfall and all survey respondents who live in a county that is included in this dataset were coded as living in an area impacted by a hurricane (1) or not (0).

Table C17: Robustness Checks: Controlling for County-Level Hurricane Disaster Declarations

	Policy Scale	Policy Scale
Intercept	0.80***	0.80***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Susceptibility	0.09**	0.08**
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Hurr Disaster Cnt 70-24	0.01	
	(0.02)	
Hurr Disaster Cnt 10-24		0.02
		(0.02)
Party ID (R)	−0.16***	−0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative	−0.20***	−0.20***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	−0.04**	−0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Missing	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
White	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.26	0.26
Adj. R^2	0.26	0.26
Num. obs.	2845	2845
RMSE	0.19	0.19
N Clusters	932	932

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level. All disaster declaration data from FEMA Disaster Declaration dataset 1970-2024 and 2010-2024 https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/disaster-declarations-summaries-v2 Column 1 covariate is a count of county-level hurricane disaster declarations from 1970 to 2024. Column 2 is a is a count of county-level hurricane disaster declarations from 2010 to 2024.

Table C18: Economic Moderators (Homeownership)

	Support Policy
Intercept	0.92***
	(0.02)
Susceptibility	0.04
	(0.03)
Homeowner	0.00
	(0.01)
Susceptibility * Homeowner	0.05
	(0.04)
Party ID (R)	−0.03***
	(0.00)
Conservative	−0.06***
	(0.01)
Age	−0.00***
	(0.00)
Female	−0.02***
	(0.01)
College	0.03***
	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	0.00
	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.04***
	(0.01)
Income Missing	−0.03*
	(0.02)
White	0.02**
	(0.01)
Wave 2	−0.01
	(0.01)
Wave 3	−0.00
	(0.01)
R^2	0.32
Adj. R^2	0.32
Num. obs.	2902
RMSE	0.19
N Clusters	984

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level.

Table C19: Economic Moderators

	Policy (Insurance)	Policy (Income)	Policy (Hotels)	Policy (Payrolls)	Policy (Home Values)
G1	1.01***	0.91***	0.90***	0.89***	0.89***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GX1	0.09	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.14
	(0.12)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.31)
G2	1.02***	0.92***	0.92***	0.92***	0.90***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GX2	−1.27	0.00	−0.07	0.03	0.95***
	(1.59)	(0.00)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.32)
G3	1.01***	0.94***	0.92***	0.92***	0.94***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GX3	0.14	0.01**	0.05	0.34*	0.29***
	(0.23)	(0.00)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.11)
DG1	0.11***	0.06	0.07**	0.06*	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)
DGX1	0.70	−0.01	−0.08	−0.13	−1.44
	(0.57)	(0.03)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(3.69)
DG2	0.01	0.10***	0.07**	0.05*	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
DGX2	−6.44	−0.01	1.27**	0.71	−2.18
	(5.84)	(0.01)	(0.58)	(0.82)	(1.48)
DG3	0.09	0.05	0.04	0.03	−0.00
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
DGX3	−1.02*	0.00	0.28	−0.01	−0.36**
	(0.57)	(0.01)	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.18)
Party ID (R)	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Conservative	−0.07***	−0.06***	−0.06***	−0.06***	−0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.01	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.00	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	−0.00		0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.03		0.03***	0.03**	0.02*
	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Missing	−0.05		−0.04**	−0.04**	−0.04**
	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
White	−0.01	0.02**	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave 2	−0.00	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave 3		−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. obs.	886	2885	3036	3036	3006

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level. Home insurance cost, number of hotels, payrolls, and home values all logged. Regression tables extracted from `interflex` package `inter.binning()` function which: (1) discretizes the moderator into three tercile bins and creates a dummy variable for each; (2) picks an evaluation point within each bin, the median of X, to estimate the conditional marginal effect of D on Y; and (3) estimates the model which includes interactions between bin dummies (moderator) and treatment indicator (sea-level rise), bin dummies and the moderator minus the evaluation points; and (3) the triple interaction. For visual see Figure C4.

Table C20: Identity Moderators (Willingness Move & Community Ties)

	Support Policy	Support Policy
Intercept	0.94***	0.90***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Susceptibility	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)
Party ID (R)	−0.03***	−0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Conservative	−0.05***	−0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	−0.00	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	−0.02**	−0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Missing	−0.03*	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
White	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave 2	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave 3	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unwill Move 4	−0.10***	
	(0.01)	
Unwill Move 3	−0.07***	
	(0.01)	
Unwill Move 2	−0.07***	
	(0.01)	
Susceptibility * Unwill Move 4	0.15**	
	(0.07)	
Susceptibility * Unwill Move 3	0.09	
	(0.06)	
Susceptibility * Unwill Move 2	0.12**	
	(0.06)	
Community Ties 4		0.06***
		(0.01)
Community Ties 3		0.00
		(0.01)
Community Ties 2		−0.02
		(0.01)
Susceptibility * Community Ties 4		0.09
		(0.06)
Susceptibility * Community Ties 3		0.11**
		(0.05)
Susceptibility * Community Ties 2		0.09
		(0.06)
R^2	0.33	0.34
Adj. R^2	0.33	0.33
Num. obs.	2989	2840
RMSE	0.19	0.19
N Clusters	1000	973

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level.

Table C21: Identity Moderators (Place-Based Identity)

	Support Policy
G1	0.91***
	(0.02)
G*X1	−0.17***
	(0.06)
G2	0.89***
	(0.02)
G*X2	0.10
	(0.19)
G3	0.90***
	(0.02)
G*X3	0.18*
	(0.10)
D*G1	0.03
	(0.03)
D*G*X1	−0.48**
	(0.24)
D*G2	0.07**
	(0.03)
D*G*X2	0.67
	(0.63)
D*G3	0.10***
	(0.03)
D*G*X3	−0.44
	(0.35)
Party ID (R)	−0.03***
	(0.00)
Conservative	−0.06***
	(0.01)
Age	−0.00***
	(0.00)
Female	−0.02***
	(0.01)
College	0.03***
	(0.01)
Income 60-125k	0.00
	(0.01)
Income Over 125k	0.04***
	(0.01)
Income Missing	−0.03
	(0.02)
White	0.02**
	(0.01)
Wave 2	−0.01
	(0.01)
Wave 3	−0.00
	(0.01)
N	2943

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at county level. Regression table extracted from `interflex` package `inter.binning()` function which: (1) discretizes the moderator into three tercile bins and creates a dummy variable for each; (2) picks an evaluation point within each bin, the median of X, to estimate the conditional marginal effect of D on Y; and (3) estimates the model which includes interactions between bin dummies and treatment indicator , bin dummies and the moderator minus the evaluation points; and (3) the triple interaction. For visual see Figure C4.

Figure C4: Interflex Estimates for All Continuous Moderators



Interflex binning estimates for continuous moderator analyses presented in Tables C21 and C19 and in the main manuscript Figure 2.

Table C22: Additional Propositions for Replication and Falsification Tests

	Prop 3 (Water)	Prop 12 (Meat)	Prop 2 (Homeless)
Intercept	0.31^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.28^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Susceptibility	0.04^{**}	-0.05^{**}	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Pct College	-0.16^{***}	0.05^{***}	0.07^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Median Income	-0.05^{***}	-0.03^{***}	-0.16^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pct Dem	0.42^{***}	0.58^{***}	0.61^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.45	0.59	0.67
Adj. R^2	0.45	0.59	0.67
Num. obs.	20766	20766	20766
RMSE	0.11	0.10	0.09
N Clusters	1563	1563	1563

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at zip level. California's 2018 Water Infrastructure, Supply, and Watershed Protection Bond, Proposition 3, is linked more tangentially to climate change than our other measures, though savvy voters who make the connection between climate change, increasing drought in California, and the need for improvements and modifications to water infrastructure and supply, would likely make that connection. This measure authorized nearly 9 billion dollars in bonds for water infrastructure improvements, groundwater storage, surface water storage, repair to dams and habitat restoration and other watershed protections. The measured failed with 50.65% of voters voting in opposition. California's 2018 Proposition 2 allowed the state to use mental health funds from new millionaires' tax to pay for housing for homeless individuals who have mental illness. The measure passed with 63% support. California's 2018 Proposition 12, established space requirements based on square feet for calves raised for veal, breeding pigs, and egg-laying hens and banned the sale of the above if they are produced in confined conditions that do not meet these space requirements. This measure also passed with 62.6% of the public vote.