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All the President's Senators: Presidential Copartisans and the Allocation of Federal Grants

Previous scholarship argues that House members' partisan relationship to the president is among the most important determinants of the share of federal dollars they bring home to their constituents. Do presidential politics also shape distributive outcomes in the Senate? Analyzing the allocation of more than \$8.5 trillion of federal grants across the states from 1984 to 2008, we show that presidential copartisan senators are more successful than opposition party members in securing federal dollars for their home states. Moreover, presidents appear to target grants *ex post* to states that gain presidential copartisans in recent elections.

In January of 1970, President Richard Nixon sent a memo to John Ehrlichman, the president's chief assistant for domestic affairs, that read: "In your budget plans . . . I want Missouri, New York, Indiana, Nevada, Wisconsin, and Minnesota to get less than they have gotten in the past." Among those six states' 12 senators, all but one was a Democrat. To dispel any doubts about his intent, Nixon wrote that "the message can get across that states with Republican senators are going to get a better audience at the White House than those with Democratic senators who are constantly chopping at us" (quoted in Reeves 2001).¹ In this article, we argue that Nixon's memo illustrates more than the mere intent of a vindictive president from a bygone era in American politics; rather, it reflects a durable pattern in the allocation of federal dollars across the country over the past quarter-century. In an analysis of each state's share of federal grant spending from 1984 to 2008, we find that senators from the party of the president get more federal dollars for their states than do senators from the opposition party. Presidents put their thumb on the scale to reward their partisan allies and punish their partisan opponents.

A core argument of legislative scholarship is that members of Congress pursue particularized benefits for their constituents in the hopes of translating federal dollars for their districts into electoral currency (e.g., Fiorina 1989; Mayhew 1974). For decades, most scholarship on distributive politics assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that legislators dominated this policy realm (e.g., Bickers and Stein 1996; Levitt and Snyder 1997; Stein and Bickers 1994). However, recent research has shown that presidents exert great influence over distributive outcomes (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; Bertelli and Grose 2009; Hudak 2014; Kriner and Reeves 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 2006; McCarty 2000) in part because voters hold presidents accountable for the share of federal benefits they receive (Kriner and Reeves 2012).

Because both branches play key roles in distributive politics, we argue that a legislator's partisan relationship to the president influences her capacity to secure federal dollars for her constituency. Presidents critically influence the ability of US senators to engage in a core re-election-oriented activity.

To test our argument, we examine the political determinants of distributive politics in the Senate. We ask: Which senators secure disproportionately large shares of federal dollars for their home state? We analyze the allocation of more than \$8.5 trillion of federal grants across the states from 1984 to 2008. We find that presidents channel federal dollars to states that elect their fellow partisans to the Senate. The number of presidential copartisan senators is one of the strongest predictors of per capita grant spending that a state receives. Moreover, presidents appear to target grants *ex post* to states that gain presidential copartisans in recent elections. Taken together, our results provide further evidence of an increasingly presidentialized system in which the White House influences the distribution of federal resources to aid the re-election prospects of their political allies in Congress.

Presidents, Senators, and Distributive Politics

For decades, distributive politics scholarship focused squarely on Congress with an emphasis on which legislators are best positioned to secure federal funds for their constituents. Recently, however, a spate of analyses has offered an important corrective by demonstrating the important role that presidents also play in shaping distributive outcomes (Bertelli and Grose 2009; Hudak 2014; Kriner and Reeves 2015a, 2015b; Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 2006; McCarty 2000). One finding is that presidents target federal dollars to districts represented by copartisan members of the House (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; though see

Dynes and Huber 2015). In so doing, presidents curry favor with copartisans and build political capital to be used for future legislative initiatives.

The reasons for this almost exclusive focus on the House are clear.²

With two-year electoral clocks, representatives assiduously seek particularized benefits for their districts in the hopes of translating them into electoral currency. However, the distributive politics literature has increasingly expanded the scope of analysis to examine the dynamics driving distributive politics in the Senate (e.g., Atlas et al. 1995; Crespin and Finocchiaro 2013; Engstrom and Vanberg 2010; Lazarus and Steigerwalt 2009; Lee 1998, 2000; Shepsle et al. 2009).

This attention to the upper chamber is also with good reason. Quintessential barons of pork barrel politics, such as Senators Robert Byrd (D-WV), Daniel Inouye (D-HI), and Ted Stevens (R-AK), are not anomalies in the upper chamber. Senators expend considerable energy and resources both pursuing localized spending for their home states and actively claiming credit for it with their constituents (Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014). Grimmer (2013) shows that 36% of Senate press releases explicitly claimed credit for an appropriation. Moreover, after routine honorary releases, the most prominent topic for Senate press releases was announcements concerning transportation grants.

Thus, many senators, like members of the House, assiduously seek particularized benefits for their home states. Previous scholarship suggests that copartisan House members are significantly better able to secure disproportionate shares of federal dollars for their districts, all else equal, than are members of the opposition party (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010). Does the same presidential influence extend to the Senate? There are at least two reasons to believe presidential influence may not be as strong in the upper chamber.

First, senators who aggressively seek federal dollars for their home states may be able to secure them regardless of whether they find an ally at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. The average senator wields considerably more power and influence in Washington than the average representative. As a result, for many House members, cooperation from the White House may be a significant advantage in gaining additional federal dollars for their constituents, while stonewalling from within the executive branch is an insurmountable impediment. Most senators, by contrast, may have the political clout to overcome such impediments.

Second, the payoff presidents stand to gain from successfully targeting federal dollars to states represented by copartisan senators may be smaller than that gained by helping a copartisan House member. Most senators' larger constituency dilutes the benefits of modest increases in federal spending (Lee 2000). Moreover, senators are elected every six

years, while House members are elected every two years. If grants are of less electoral importance to senators, it could significantly weaken presidential incentives to court favor with copartisan senators via federal grants. Moreover, given senators' greater independent power base, presidents may be at a disadvantage more generally in any endeavor to curry favor by helping a senator secure particularized benefits for his or her home state. As a result, our analysis of whether distributive politics in the Senate are affected by presidential politics is an important test of the reach of the president's influence.

The Mechanisms of Presidential Influence over Spending

Previous scholarship has explored in detail a range of *ex ante* and *ex post* mechanisms through which presidents can affect the geographic allocation of federal dollars across the country (inter alia, Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; Dynes and Huber 2015; Hudak 2014; Kriner and Reeves 2015a). A complete review is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we focus on several mechanisms that may be particularly important in enabling presidents to target resources to copartisan senators or by which copartisan senators will have more success influencing budgetary decisions made within the executive branch.

Distributive politics scholarship has long recognized that the power of proposal affords significant influence over ultimate allocation; indeed, this is the foundation of many arguments for committee power over areas of spending within their substantive purview (e.g., McCarty 2000). However, since the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the budget process has begun at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue as presidents have prepared and submitted to Congress an annual budgetary proposal. Budget requests and proposals are formulated within the departments and agencies. However, presidents possess two powerful tools to influence the content of these proposals. First, through political appointments, presidents staff the executive branch with individuals who share their programmatic vision and political orientation to lead the proposal formulation process. Second, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversees this process, and among its most important tasks is to ensure that the proposals from the departments and agencies are in accordance with the program and political imperatives of the president (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010, 785). Indeed, to improve political control, a key reform of the 1970s reorganization of the Bureau of the Budget into OMB was the creation of a new layer of political appointees that sat atop the examining divisions that play a key role in the budgetary process (Kriner and Reeves 2015b, 119–20; Lewis 2008, 35–36).

Through both political appointees and OMB review (and agency anticipation of it), presidents can influence the programmatic priorities of budgetary proposals. This, in turn, can have significant distributive ramifications as some programs will concentrate their benefits in certain key states while all but precluding benefits from flowing to other states (Hudak 2014, 162). In this way, presidents may target federal resources to states represented by copartisans. Senators and other members of Congress may logically try to influence these proposals even before they are submitted to Congress by exploiting their relationships with the agencies they oversee. However, there are strong reasons to suspect that copartisan senators will receive a more welcome reception than senators from the opposition. Moreover, suggestions from copartisan senators are more likely to be judged by OMB as consistent with the program and priorities of the president. More generally, budgetary proposals can be crafted in ways that maximize discretion for departments and agencies during implementation. Of course, Congress must ultimately pass the appropriations bills, which may deviate substantially from the president's initial proposals. However, even in such cases, the president's agenda-setting power is substantial (Schick 2000, 109).

Presidents possess perhaps even stronger levers to influence the geographic allocation of federal dollars after funds have been appropriated. During the implementation stage, OMB and political appointees are again key actors that assist the president in pursuing his preferred allocation of federal resources and that may aid the requests of copartisan senators. The OMB also plays a critical role filtering communication between Congress and the departments and agencies, severely limiting congressional access to and influence over agencies and the allocation process (Hudak 2014, 172–74). Because appropriations bills delegate considerable discretion to departments and agencies, members of Congress routinely seek to influence allocation after passage. In elite interviews, Hudak (2014) shows that the OMB often serves as a screen determining who on the Hill gains access to the bureaucracy and how much access they get. Given OMB's role as a defender of the president's political interests, there are strong reasons to expect copartisan senators to enjoy greater access than opposition party senators to key bureaucratic decision makers concerning funding allocations. This should give copartisan senators a significant advantage in seeking to influence the allocation of federal dollars at the implementation phase.

OMB also possesses multiple levers to enable presidential targeting of federal dollars to states represented by copartisan senators. For example, OMB can influence the allocation of grant dollars even after the standard review process has been completed by changing the order

in which proposals are funded in many programs. This, in turn, can affect both the timing and the geographic location of many funding allocations (Hudak 1974, 173). In the case of politically sensitive grants, OMB has even insisted that agencies seek preclearance before the grants are awarded to ensure that allocation decisions are consistent with presidential priorities (Berman 1978, 521; Lewis 2016, 11). Moreover, in addition to its preclearance authority over agency budgetary proposals, OMB also has control over the apportionment of funds once appropriated. To bolster its and the White House's influence over agency spending decisions, since the 1970s OMB has added specific requirements about how money must be spent to agency apportionment requests to ensure that OMB would later agree to apportion the funds once appropriated (Lewis 2016; Tomkin 1998, 187).


Political appointees within the departments and agencies can also use discretion granted their unit within the appropriation legislation to allocate federal resources in a way that is consistent both with the spirit of the legislation and with the political needs of the president (Hudak 2014; Kriner and Reeves 2015b). Political appointees can thus have the capacity to assist presidential party building and favor courting efforts in the Senate. Moreover, political appointees can be attuned and responsive to the needs of copartisan senators, even without any explicit direction from the White House. For example, to head the Superfund toxic waste cleanup program, President Reagan chose Rita Lavelle, a former press staffer in his gubernatorial office who later worked for several major chemical corporations.³ Lavelle brought her political instincts, honed in the governor's office, to her new position. For example, Lavelle fought to honor Senator Richard Lugar's (R-IN) request to announce funds for a cleanup at Seymour, Indiana, before his re-election bid.⁴

Prior empirical analyses of federal spending have offered considerable evidence that presidents, through these and other mechanisms, exert considerable influence over the geographic allocation of federal dollars (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; Dynes and Huber 2015; Hudak 2014; Kriner and Reeves 2015b; Rogowski 2016). Data from the 2014 Survey on the Future of Government Service confirm that career executives in a wide range of federal agencies believe that the president has at least some direct influence over how funds appropriated by Congress are spent (Lewis 2016, 20).⁵

Modeling the Allocation of Federal Grants across the States

We test our core hypothesis that presidential copartisans bring more federal dollars to their home states by examining the geographic

FIGURE 1
Histogram of Ln (State per Capita Grants), 1984–2008



allocation of more than \$8.5 trillion of federal grant spending across the country from 1984 through 2008. We focus on federal grants because, as Berry, Burden, and Howell argue, grants are “the category of spending most amenable to pork-barreling” (2010, 790). In contrast to more narrow spending categories such as earmarks, which normally account for less than 1% of federal spending, federal grants (both project grants and formula grants) constitute a substantial piece of the budgetary pie. For instance, in 2008 of a total federal budget of \$4.42 trillion, \$576 billion (or approximately 13%) was allocated to grants for hundreds of programs. For our analysis, we obtained data on state-level allocations of federal grant dollars from the Consolidated Federal Funds Reports (CFFR).

Past scholarship analyzing the geographic distribution of federal spending has employed several operationalizations of the dependent variable. We first considered modeling the per capita grant total received by each state in each year (e.g., Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 2006; Lee 1998). However, as shown in the online supporting information, the distribution of state per capita grant totals has a long right tail. To ensure that outlying values do not skew our estimates, we operationalized our dependent variable as the natural log of each state’s per capita grants total in each year.⁶ The distribution of our dependent variable is illustrated in Figure 1.

Our main independent variable of interest is the number of presidential copartisan senators in each state in the Congress during which consideration of the fiscal year's appropriations bills began.⁷ From 1984 through 2008, states were almost evenly divided across the three possible outcomes. Just under a third of states were represented by zero presidential copartisans in a given election year; 38% were represented by one presidential copartisan; and in 30% of cases, both senators shared the president's partisan affiliation. If our hypothesis is correct, a state should receive a larger share of federal grants per capita as the number of presidential copartisans increases.

To ensure that any relationship observed between senators and grant spending is not spurious, we also control for a number of senate and constituency characteristics that might affect the share of federal spending. In recent decades, scholars found considerable evidence of majority-party influence, particularly in the House (Balla et al. 2002; Bickers and Stein 2000; Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Levitt and Snyder 1995). Although partisan forces may be weaker in the Senate than in the House, recent research makes clear that the majority party continues to enjoy significant institutional advantages in the upper chamber (e.g., Den Hartog and Monroe 2011; Gailmard and Jenkins 2007; Monroe, Roberts, and Rohde 2008). To test whether majority-party members, not presidential copartisans, are advantaged at securing federal grants for their home states, we control for the number of senators in each state who are members of the majority party.

Alternatively, some scholars have argued that Democratic senators are better able to capitalize on federal spending at the ballot box than are Republicans (Alvarez and Saving 1997; Crespín and Finocchiaro 2013; Lazarus and Reilly 2010). If correct, then Democratic senators should have stronger incentives to pursue particularized benefits than Republican senators. To test this alternate hypothesis, our model also includes the number of Democratic senators in each state.

Apart from partisanship, senators with positions on key committees or within the party leadership structure may be better positioned to secure federal grants. To account for this possibility, we include variables identifying the number of senators from each state who serve on each of the three committees with some direct authority over budgetary outcomes: Appropriations, Finance, and the Budget Committee. We also include additional variables for the number of a state's senators who serve as committee chairs as well as for the number of state senators who serve within the party leadership.⁸

Past scholarship also suggests that electoral marginality may explain variation in how assiduously senators will seek pork (Grimmer,

Westwood, and Messing 2014; Stein and Bickers 1994). To account for this dynamic, our models include three measures of vulnerability. First, because freshmen senators may be more vulnerable and therefore possess stronger incentives to seek distributive benefits than longer-tenured senators, we include a count of the number of freshmen senators in each state. Second, we include an indicator identifying whether a state has a senator up for re-election in each congressional election year. Third, for those senators facing a re-election challenge, we include a measure of candidate quality on a 4-point scale derived from Lublin (1994); challengers who never previously held elected office are coded 0, while current and former members of the House of Representatives receive the highest score of 4.

Finally, although our focus is the Senate, we also account for dynamics in the House. Previous research suggests that presidents channel resources to districts represented by copartisan representatives (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; Kriner and Reeves 2015a; Rogowski 2016). States that elect presidential copartisan senators may also choose copartisans to fill a large share of their House delegation. As a result, we also include in our models the percentage of each state's House delegation comprised of presidential copartisans. This allows us to examine whether copartisan senators are more successful in bringing home federal grants for their districts, even after accounting for the effect of copartisan House members.

Results

We estimate least squares regression models that include both state and year fixed effects and that report standard errors clustered on the state.⁹ The inclusion of state fixed effects allows us to assess the influence of the partisan composition of a state's senatorial delegation while controlling for all time-invariant state characteristics—both observed and unobserved. The inclusion of year fixed effects controls for overarching temporal shifts in grant spending levels. In all, the fixed effects specifications allow us to focus on the variables that vary over time and across states—that is, those pertaining to our hypotheses—while holding constant all the a priori factors that make years and states different.¹⁰ Table 1 presents the results.

The first model of Table 1 includes only our independent variable of interest, the number of presidential copartisan senators in a state's delegation, along with the state and year fixed effects. In this model specification, the relationship between the number of presidential copartisans and a state's level of per capita grant spending is positive and

TABLE 1
Senators, Presidential Politics, and the Allocation of Federal Grants,
1984 to 2008

	(1)	(2)
# Presidential copartisan senators	0.018*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.005)
# Majority party senators		0.011** (0.005)
# Democratic senators		-0.017 (0.010)
% House delegation copartisans		0.032** (0.014)
Appropriations committee		0.002 (0.010)
Budget committee		0.012 (0.012)
Finance committee		0.013 (0.013)
Committee chair		0.010 (0.011)
Leader		-0.009 (0.019)
# Freshmen senators		0.005 (0.007)
Senator up for re-election		-0.003 (0.006)
Challenger quality (if facing re-election)		0.001 (0.002)
Observations	1,250	1,250
R ²	0.910	0.914
Number of states	50	50

Notes: Dependent variable is Ln (per capita grants) received by each state from 1984 to 2008. Least squares models with state and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

highly statistically significant. This is strong initial support for our hypothesis that presidential politics moderate the first dimension of the electoral connection. Presidential copartisan senators are more successful at securing more federal dollars for their home states than are opposition party senators.

The second model includes all of the control variables. In this expanded specification, we continue to find strong support for our hypothesis that states represented by presidential copartisan senators receive more federal grant dollars, all else being equal, than states

represented by senators of the opposition party. The coefficient is positive, as hypothesized, and statistically significant. Our results show that a state with one presidential copartisan receives 1.4% more in per capita grant spending than a state with no presidential copartisans in the Senate. We find that states with two presidential copartisan senators receive an increase of more than 2.8% in per capita grant spending than an otherwise identical state with zero presidential copartisans in the Senate.¹¹

Several of the control variables also influenced spending in the expected direction. The coefficient on the number of majority-party senators is positive and statistically significant. Indeed, the magnitude of the observed effect closely matches that observed by Albouy (2013), who also estimated that states with two majority-party senators receive, on average, roughly 2% more in spending than do states with zero senators in the majority. We also found continued evidence consistent with past research arguing that presidents target federal spending to extend their influence in the House. As the percentage of a state's House delegation increases, so too does its expected share of federal grant spending.

We find little evidence that many other control variables had a significant effect on the share of federal grant spending that a state receives. States represented by Democrats do not systematically receive more spending than states represented by Republicans. We also find little evidence that members of key budgetary committees or committee chairs or party leaders leverage their positions to channel disproportionate shares of federal dollars to their home states. Finally, we find little evidence that electorally vulnerable members were more aggressive in seeking and successful in securing disproportionately large shares of federal grant spending for their home states.

Instead, members of the majority party, even in the Senate, appear advantaged in the distributive politics game. And presidents remain important players even in the Senate. Even after controlling for the partisan composition of a state's House delegation, states with more presidential copartisan senators received significantly more federal grant spending, all else being equal, than did states represented by senators from the partisan opposition.

Isolating the Influence of Same Party Senators versus State Mass Partisanship

In a recent critique of presidential targeting of copartisan legislators in the House, Dynes and Huber (2015) note that copartisan legislators often represent constituencies replete with copartisan voters. As a result, it can be difficult to untangle whether the mass partisanship of a district

TABLE 2
Grant Allocation Controlling for Presidential Partisanship of State,
1984–2008

	(1)
# Presidential copartisan senators	0.011** (0.005)
# Majority party senators	0.011** (0.005)
# Democratic senators	−0.017 (0.010)
% House delegation copartisans	0.023 (0.015)
Appropriations committee	0.002 (0.010)
Budget committee	0.011 (0.012)
Finance committee	0.013 (0.013)
Committee chair	0.009 (0.011)
Leader	−0.006 (0.019)
# Freshmen senators	0.005 (0.007)
Senator up for re-election	−0.002 (0.006)
Challenger quality (if facing re-election)	0.001 (0.002)
Presidential vote share in state in last election	0.109* (0.063)
Constant	7.324*** (0.037)
Observations	1,250
Number of states	50
R ²	0.914

Notes: Dependent variable is Ln (per capita grants) received by each state from 1984 to 2008. Least squares model with state and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

or the partisanship of its representative in Congress is driving any observed increase in federal spending. To ensure that the relationship between copartisan senators and federal grants is not an artifact of a state's mass partisanship, we reestimate our model with an additional control: the share of the two-party vote that the incumbent president won in each state in the preceding election. Table 2 presents the results.

Paralleling the finding of Dynes and Huber (2015), we find evidence that states that support the incumbent president at the polls receive a disproportionately large share of federal grant spending. The relevant coefficient is positive and statistically significant. However, even after including this additional control, we continue to find strong evidence that presidential copartisan senators secure more grant spending for their states, *ceteris paribus*. The coefficient remains positive and statistically significant.

Placebo Test: Disability and Retirement Spending

The degree of presidential influence over spending allocation decisions will vary significantly across programs. Our analysis focuses on federal grants because, as prior scholarship has noted, this area of spending is particularly amenable to pork barrel politicking (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010). However, within the broad category of federal grants, there is considerable variation in the degree of discretion executive branch actors have over geographic allocation. Moreover, recent research suggests that presidents may have more influence over the allocation decisions of some agencies than others and that this influence can vary over time with presidential priorities (Lewis 2016). Teasing out these relationships is an important ground for future research.

To bolster confidence that the relationships we have observed are being driven by the president, we conduct a placebo test and examine another category of federal spending over whose geographic allocation the president should have very little short-term influence: federal retirement and disability spending. In 2008, this was the largest single category of spending included in the CFFR and accounted for almost \$820 billion. Because retirement and disability benefits are apportioned by strict eligibility criteria that are all but immune from short-term political influence, we should not see any relationship between the number of copartisan senators in a state, or any other political factor, and that state's share of retirement and disability spending. If, however, we find a relationship between senate copartisanship and retirement and disability spending, it would suggest that our earlier results are potentially spurious and that our measure may be tapping into some unmeasured dynamic in copartisan states.

Table 3 replicates our full model from column 2 of Table 1 but instead uses the natural log of each state's per capita retirement and disability spending total from 1984 through 2008 as the dependent variable. Strongly consistent with expectations, the coefficient for the number

TABLE 3
Senators, Presidential Partisanship, and Retirement and
Disability Spending

	(1)
# Presidential copartisan senators	0.001 (0.002)
# Majority party senators	-0.001 (0.002)
# Democratic senators	-0.007 (0.005)
% House delegation copartisans	-0.002 (0.009)
Appropriations committee	0.002 (0.008)
Budget committee	0.006 (0.006)
Finance committee	0.009 (0.007)
Committee chair	0.005 (0.004)
Leader	-0.010 (0.013)
# Freshmen senators	0.005 (0.003)
Senator up for re-election	-0.003 (0.002)
Challenger quality (if facing re-election)	-0.001 (0.001)
Constant	7.865*** (0.012)
Observations	1,250
R ²	0.853
Number of states	50

Notes: Dependent variable is Ln (per capita retirement and disability spending) received by each state from 1984 to 2008. Least squares model with state and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

of presidential copartisan senators in a state is substantively small (indeed, it is almost indistinguishable from zero), and it is not statistically significant. More generally, as expected, none of a state's political characteristics are significant predictors of the amount of retirement and disability spending it receives in a given year. The null results in this placebo test are consistent with our argument that the effects of the political variables in our analysis of federal grant spending—whose

allocation is a subject of political contestation—are not artifacts of more general forces influencing the geographic allocation of all types of spending.

Exploring the Interaction of Presidential Copartisanship and Majority Party Status

Our core analysis in Table 1 offers evidence that both presidential copartisan senators and majority-party senators enjoy advantages in securing federal grant spending for their home states. Do presidential copartisans enjoy an even greater advantage when they are also in the majority? Or put slightly differently, does being a presidential copartisan continue to afford an advantage in the distributive realm even when a senator is in the minority? We do not expect the advantage of copartisanship to vary depending on whether a copartisan senator is in the majority or minority. If the increased grant spending received by copartisan senators is a product of presidents actively pursuing programs that channel federal dollars disproportionately to states that elect copartisan senators—whether that is by designing budget proposals that will accomplish this aim or by using *ex post* authority to steer grant dollars toward such states—they should have incentives to do so regardless of whether their copartisans are in the majority or minority. The increased spending that states with more copartisan senators receive could also be the result of these senators' efforts. Requests for programmatic changes that would benefit their home states may be more likely to make it through the OMB filter and receive a more favorable response from politically attuned officials in the departments and agencies than similar requests from opposition party senators. Copartisanship, not majority-party status, should be the key.

To examine whether the influence of copartisanship varies by majority-party status, we reestimate our analysis from Table 1 with a new variable: an interaction of the number of copartisan senators in a state with an indicator of whether the president's party is in the minority.¹² Table 4 presents the results.

The coefficient for the main effect remains positive and statistically significant. When the president's copartisans are in the majority, as the number of presidential copartisan senators increases in a state, so too does its per capita grant total. Does a similar dynamic hold when the president's copartisans are in the minority? The results in Table 4 show that it does. The coefficient on the relevant interaction is negative; however, the coefficient is substantively small and statistically insignificant. Regardless of whether the president's copartisans are in the majority or

TABLE 4
Interaction of Copartisanship and Majority Status and
Federal Grant Spending

	(1)
# Presidential copartisan senators	0.017*** (0.006)
# Presidential copartisan senators when in minority	-0.004 (0.006)
# Majority party senators	0.010** (0.005)
# Democratic senators	-0.016 (0.010)
% House delegation copartisans	0.032** (0.014)
Appropriations committee	0.002 (0.010)
Budget committee	0.012 (0.012)
Finance committee	0.013 (0.013)
Committee chair	0.010 (0.011)
Leader	-0.009 (0.019)
# Freshmen senators	0.004 (0.007)
Senator up for re-election	-0.003 (0.006)
Challenger quality (if facing re-election)	0.001 (0.002)
Constant	7.077*** (0.025)
Observations	1,250
Number of states	50
R ²	0.914

Notes: Dependent variable is Ln (per capita grants) received by each state from 1984 to 2008. Least squares model with state and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed. The indicator identifying whether the president's party is in the minority is subsumed in the year fixed effects. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

minority, the number of copartisans in a state remains a significant predictor of its share of federal grant spending. Moreover, the estimated magnitude of this effect is statistically indistinguishable across periods of unified and divided government.

Looking for Evidence of Ex Post Influence

Following prior scholarship, we have described a series of *ex ante* and *ex post* mechanisms through which presidents might influence the geographic allocation of federal spending and target funds toward states represented by copartisan senators. However, while analyzing aggregated spending data across many programs has many advantages, including ensuring that the phenomenon we are analyzing is of immediate and widespread political import, tracing the pathways of presidential influence is difficult. Instead, we examine patterns in the allocation of grant dollars over time and look for evidence that those patterns match the president's political interests rather than those of other actors in our system. When we see that states represented by copartisan senators reap a disproportionate share of federal grant spending, this is strong evidence of presidential influence over the allocation process. However, we cannot be sure at this point exactly how presidents are producing the observed allocations.

One way to test the mechanism is to exploit shifts in the composition of the Senate and the partisan relationship of its membership to the president created by both midterm and presidential elections. The federal government's fiscal year begins on October 1 of the preceding calendar year. This means that the Congress responsible for the bulk of the appropriating of a fiscal year's funds may be different from the Congress that is in office during most of the implementation phase if a midterm or presidential election occurs in November of the fiscal year.

If presidents influence allocation of grants *ex post* (either by seeking to target funds to states with copartisan senators or by responding more favorably to requests from copartisan senators), then states that gain presidential copartisans in an election should see an increase in grant spending, above and beyond what was predicted given the composition of its senatorial delegation in the preceding Congress that was in power during the appropriations process before the fiscal year began. By contrast, states that lose copartisan senators (either because a copartisan senator is defeated or because partisan control of the presidency itself switches following a presidential election) stand to lose federal grant dollars if *ex post* mechanisms are an important component of presidential influence.

To look for evidence consistent with *ex post* mechanisms, we reexamine grant spending in the fiscal years that straddle national elections (e.g., 1985, 1987, 1989, etc.) and include an additional variable in our model: the change in the number of presidential copartisans in each state following the November election. This variable can take on any integer

TABLE 5
Looking for Evidence of *Ex Ante* Influence

	(1)
# Presidential copartisan senators	0.014** (0.006)
Change in # copartisans during fiscal year	0.013** (0.007)
# Majority party senators	0.006 (0.005)
# Democratic senators	-0.014 (0.010)
% House delegation copartisans	0.033** (0.014)
Appropriations committee	0.001 (0.011)
Budget committee	0.018 (0.014)
Finance committee	0.020 (0.014)
Committee chair	0.011 (0.009)
Leader	-0.007 (0.018)
# Freshmen senators	0.005 (0.008)
Senator up for re-election	-0.003 (0.006)
Challenger quality (if facing re-election)	0.001 (0.003)
Constant	7.053*** (0.024)
Observations	600
Number of states	50
R ²	0.934

Notes: Dependent variable is Ln (per capita grants) received by each state from 1984 to 2008. Least squares model with state and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

value from -2 to 2 , and in more than 20% of cases during these years, the variable took on a value other than 0. The results are presented in Table 5.

Even when restricting our sample to the fiscal years that straddle national elections (i.e., odd number years), the coefficient for the number of copartisan senators in the enacting Congress is positive and

statistically significant. States represented by more presidential copartisans during the bulk of the appropriations process received more grant spending, on average, than states represented by fewer or no presidential copartisans.

Moreover, the model also finds evidence consistent with *ex post* influence. States that saw their number of presidential copartisans increase during a fiscal year because of the November election (which occurs approximately one month into the fiscal year) also saw a significant increase in grant spending. For example, the election of Bill Clinton in 1992 changed the status of 16 states from having zero presidential copartisans to having two presidential copartisan senators. Our model estimates that these states enjoyed a 2.6% increase in spending by virtue of Bill Clinton winning the presidency over the incumbent George H. W. Bush. By contrast, our model predicts that states that saw their number of copartisan senators decrease experienced a significant drop in grant spending.

Discussion

Recent scholarship has rediscovered the significant role of presidents in distributive politics. Far from being neutral implementers who simply dispose of what Congress proposes, presidents shape the allocation of federal benefits across the country, from federal contracts (Bertelli and Grose 2009) to federal grants (Kriner and Reeves 2015a). Presidents use this leverage over distributive politics to bolster their own electoral prospects, to reward core constituencies, to build their partisan base, and to strengthen legislative coalitions on Capitol Hill (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; Hudak 2014). Moreover, recent research makes clear that presidential influence over distributive outcomes is nothing new. Even in an era of congressional dominance, presidents channeled one of the nation's most precious patronage-producing resources, post offices, disproportionately to constituencies that elected copartisans to the House (Rogowski 2016).

Lost amidst this renewed emphasis on the president's role in the distributive arena is whether presidential involvement affects distributive outcomes in the Senate. Recent research confirms what anecdotal evidence has long suggested: senators seek particularistic benefits for their home states as aggressively as House members (Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014). We find that presidential politics condition a senator's capacity to bring home the bacon for her home state. Even though the average senator wields more institutional power than the average House member, we nonetheless find strong empirical evidence that presidential politics also shape distributive outcomes in the upper chamber. States with

more presidential copartisans in the Senate receive a significantly greater share of federal grant spending, all else being equal, than states represented by the partisan opposition. Notably, a similar pattern did not emerge in retirement and disability spending, which is not subject to political influence. Finally, our analysis also offers insight into the mechanisms of presidential influence. Strongly consistent with posited mechanisms of *ex post* influence over allocation decisions, we found that states that experienced an increase in the number of copartisan senators during an election were rewarded with an increased share of federal grant spending.

While our results provide evidence that presidential politics influence distributive outcomes even in the Senate, a number of important questions remain. First and perhaps most importantly, additional analysis at the program level could help isolate the specific mechanisms that allow such targeting of funds. The level and timing of discretion and degree of bureaucratic responsiveness to presidential priorities undoubtedly varies considerably across agencies (Lewis 2016). More nuanced analyses building on new research in this area could explicate more fully the potential for and limitations on presidential influence over geographic budgetary allocations.

Second, it remains an open question how widely presidential particularistic influence extends beyond divide-the-dollar politics. Historical exemplars abound of presidents shaping national policy based on the preferences of their core constituencies (see generally Kriner and Reeves 2015b). For example, an aide for President Nixon claimed that, in addition to using federal grants for electoral purposes, a discrimination lawsuit against the University of Texas was quashed in order to save face for Texas's Republican Senator John Tower, who was running for re-election.¹³ Future research should continue to examine the conditions under which presidents pursue policies that concentrate costs and benefits along political criteria at the expense of the national interest.

Finally, future research should also explore whether the dynamic we uncover is strengthening as another unanticipated consequence of the increasing presidentialization of our politics. Rather than focusing solely on whether the balance of power between the branches has swung too far from Congress to the president (e.g., Fisher 2000; Goldsmith 2012; Mann and Ornstein 2006), future scholarship should also examine how this presidentialization skews other aspects of our politics where presidents have long been presumed to play either no role or an ancillary one.

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NOTES

1. The lone Republican senator in the list of states was Jacob Javits, a supporter of Nelson Rockefeller, the governor of New York who ran against Nixon in 1968. Two years later, the *New York Times* noted that Republican Senator Strom Thurmond was “counting his rewards” for supporting Nixon in the form of “numerous federal grants” (Gregg Harrington, “Thurmond Counts His Rewards,” *New York Times*, January 3, 1972, p. A7).

2. For an important exception, see Bertelli and Grose (2009, 938), who examine whether the degree of ideological congruence between the Secretaries of Defense and Labor and home state senators influence the amount of DOL grants and DOD contracts states receive between 1991 and 2002. Interestingly, Bertelli and Grose do not find that states represented by more presidential copartisans receive more grants/contracts. They speculate that multicollinearity between president-senator ideological divergence and partisan congruence may be masking party effects.

3. In applying for the job, Lavelle thanked Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver for his “continued support” for her “rejoining the Reagan team”—a paradigmatic example of “politicization” (Memorandum, Rita Lavelle to Michael Deaver, September 22, 1981, folder, “Environmental Protection Agency (1),” Michael Deaver Files, Box 38, Ronald Reagan Library).

4. Memorandum, Fielding to Meese, Baker, Deaver, and Von Damm, February 17, 1983. Folder, “Investigation Material II,” Benedict Cohen Files Box 14, Ronald Reagan Library. In another communication to Deaver, Lavelle recommended the president attend a ceremony in Trenton to announce Superfund monies for a series of projects in New Jersey: “From this platform the President can summarize the successes of all of EPA as well as support the candidacies of New Jersey [Republican] candidates, including [senatorial candidate] Millicent Fenwick” (Memorandum, Rita Lavelle to Mike Deaver, September 13, 1982. Folder, “Lavelle, Rita (3),” Counsel to the President, WH Office, Box 12, Ronald Reagan Library).

5. Subjects were asked to rate both presidential and congressional influence over allocation decisions. On average, the bureaucrats surveyed ranked congressional influence slightly higher; however, the two were highly correlated, and in some agencies presidents were judged more influential than Congress.

6. This is the same specification as that used by Hudak (2014). We also reestimated all of our analyses instead operationalizing the dependent variable as the logged

grants total received by each state in each year and controlling for each state's population (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; Kriner and Reeves 2015a). As shown in the online supporting information, using unlogged per capita grants or logged grants and controlling for population yields substantively similar results.

7. In recent years, many appropriations bills have not been passed before the start of the new fiscal year and often not even until the start of the new Congress. Replicating all of our models with the number of copartisan senators in the Congress who took office during the current fiscal year yields substantively similar results (Table 14 in the online supporting information). However, the models in the text follow Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010) and use the composition of the Congress in session when consideration of the appropriations bills began. In a subsequent analysis, we also test whether a change in senatorial composition following an election affects the amount of federal grant spending a state receives.

8. Additionally, a number of past studies have found that small state senators enjoy significant advantages in securing disproportionate shares of federal dollars (e.g., Atlas et al. 1995; Lee 1998; Lauderdale 2008; Lee and Oppenheimer 1999). Variation in state size is accounted for by the inclusion of state fixed effects. The resulting coefficients are not reported; however, examining the state fixed effects confirms that small states do indeed receive disproportionately large shares of grant spending, all else equal.

9. An alternative to clustering on state would be to use panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995), which assume many observations per panel/state but allow for panel-level heteroskedasticity as well as contemporaneous correlation of observations between the panels. Unlike the clustering approach, only correlation between observations in different panels is allowed here. Within-panel correlation is only allowed in the form of an AR(1) process. Moreover, it is suspected that the finite sample properties of this approach are limited when the panel's N is large compared to the time T . Thus, we believe our clustering approach is better justified than that of the panel-corrected standard errors. The online supporting information replicates our results with PCSE and shows that the standard error estimates with the clustered approach are more conservative (i.e., larger) than that of the panel-corrected standard errors approach.

10. In the online supporting information, we reestimate model 2 in Table 1 with three additional state-level demographic controls (population; per capita income; state unemployment rate) that do vary by year. Results are virtually identical (Table 13 in the online supporting information).

11. To examine whether the increase in grant spending produced by an increase in the number of presidential copartisan senators from zero to one to two is indeed linear, we also reestimated our models with two dummy variables, one identifying states with one presidential copartisan, the other identifying states with two presidential copartisans. Both coefficients are positive, and the coefficient for two presidential copartisans is approximately double in magnitude the coefficient for one copartisan. See the online supporting information for an extended discussion.

12. The indicator identifying whether the president's party is in the minority is subsumed in the year fixed effects.

13. Special to the *New York Times*, "Nixon Aide Admits Grants Were Used to Win Votes in '72," *New York Times*, January 16, 1974, p. 1.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:

Figure 1. Histogram of State per Capita Grants, 1984–2008

Figure 2. Histogram of Ln (state grants), 1984–2008

Table 1. Replicate Table 1 with per Capita Grants

Table 2. Replicate Table 2 with per Capita Grants

Table 3. Replicate Table 3 with per Capita Grants

Table 4. Replicate Table 4 with per Capita Grants

Table 5. Replicate Table 5 with per Capita Grants

Table 6. Replicate Table 1 with Ln (grants) and Control for Ln (population)

Table 7. Replicate Table 2 with Ln (grants) and Control for Ln (population)

Table 8. Replicate Table 3 with Ln (grants) and Control for Ln (population)

Table 9. Replicate Table 4 with Ln (grants) and Control for Ln (population)

Table 10. Replicate Table 5 with Ln (grants) and Control for Ln (population)

Table 11. Models with 1 and 2 Copartisan Dummies, Ln (per capita grants)

Table 12. Models with 1 and 2 Copartisan Dummies, per Capita Grants

Table 13. Replicate Core Results of Table 1 with State Demographics

Table 14. Replicate Table 1 with Fiscal Year's Congress (not enacting Congress)